Whither to, Obama? : U.S. democracy promotion after the Cold War by Poppe, Annika E.
Whither to, Obama?
U.S. democracy promotion after the Cold War
Annika E. Poppe
PRIF-Report No. 96
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2010 
 
 
 
Correspondence to: 
HSFK  Baseler Straße 27-31  60329 Frankfurt am Main 
Phone: +49(0)69 95 91 04-0  Fax: +49(0)69 55 84 81 
E-mail: poppe@hsfk.de  Internet: www.prif.org 
 
 
ISBN: 978-3-942532-07-5 
 
Euro 10.- 
 
  
Summary 
When George W. Bush assumed office in January 2001, many pundits – some benevo-
lently, others grudgingly – considered the new president’s main agenda to be as simple as 
ABC – Anything But Clinton. When President Barack Obama assumed office eight years 
later, many correspondingly described the latest president’s approach as ABB – Anything 
But Bush. The current U.S. president has inherited quite a number of difficult situations 
and crises from his predecessor that he has vowed to handle very differently: among oth-
ers, the two unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the treatment of prisoners in 
Guantánamo and other, undisclosed locations, the global financial crisis, the relationship 
to Pakistan and Iran, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. This PRIF Report is concerned with 
how Obama handles one particularly tainted legacy of the Bush administration: the global 
promotion of democracy. Is Obama discarding his predecessor’s favorite but severely 
criticized project, is he keeping it with slight modifications, or is he taking a completely 
new approach? 
In order to answer this question, this PRIF Report turns to the larger context in which 
the Obama administration is operating. It first looks at how the idea of being an excep-
tional nation has shaped an exemplarist and an activist variant of democracy promotion, 
and portrays the current debate about this policy’s underlying rationales and its impact. It 
then assesses Obama’s immediate predecessors, Clinton and Bush, in terms of their de-
mocracy promotion policies and the rationales they have mustered in its favor. In light of 
these parameters that form the backdrop against which the Obama administration has to 
position itself, the current administration’s first initiatives regarding democracy promo-
tion are assessed and interpreted with a view to this policy’s future. 
Obama, as this analysis shows, cannot and will not abandon democracy promotion al-
together. Deeply engrained in the country’s national identity is the notion that the United 
States holds a special place and has a special role to play among the nations of the world. 
A central part of this American ‘exceptionalism’ is the ambition to liberate and enlighten 
the world by endowing it with human rights and democracy. That it is part of a genuine 
American mission to promote democracy abroad is fairly uncontroversial and no U.S. 
president can elude the issue. Controversies about how to promote democracy, however, 
have shaped the 20th century, especially the post-Cold War presidencies, and just as the 
controversy over means – quiet exemplarism or active (peaceful or military) intervention 
– the set of rationales for democracy promotion has developed and changed over time 
and remains a matter of considerable contention at the beginning of the 21st century.  
The analysis of rationales the Clinton and Bush administrations have drawn upon to 
legitimize the promotion of democracy shows that normative arguments play a very cen-
tral role. Rationalist reasoning, however, is just as important: spreading democracy 
abroad, administration officials insist, makes the United States more secure, creates stable 
markets and opportunities for trade, provides other peoples with prosperity and security, 
and contributes to world peace. The Obama presidency, slow to develop its own democ-
racy agenda and rhetoric, likewise draws upon normative motivations but is relatively 
silent when it comes to promoting democracy based on an agenda which pursues its own 
 II 
interests. This stands in especially sharp contrast to the Bush administrations, which had 
forcefully maintained that promoting democracy everywhere was a security imperative 
and did not shy away from accomplishing this aim through the use of military force, and 
which regularly employed Manichean language to underline the significance of democ-
racy promotion as a foreign policy panacea. The Obama team has substantially scaled 
back the use of such grandiose rhetoric and has assumed a markedly more reserved stance 
on the issue.  
In many respects, as it takes its first steps on the issue the Obama administration re-
sembles the Clinton presidency in how it handles the promotion of democracy. Democ-
racy promotion under Obama seems once again to be considered one goal among others 
and is handled within a basically pragmatic foreign policy direction. Obama, like Clinton, 
favors a non-confrontational approach to democracy promotion, focusing on states that 
are inviting help from outside – and not primarily on rogue states as Bush did – and also 
decidedly favors multilateralism over unilateralism. Like both preceding presidencies, the 
Obama administration has raised the budget for democracy assistance and has affirmed 
repeatedly that it is committed to spreading democracy abroad as a responsibility the 
American people owe to the world.  
Whereas, overall, democracy promotion under Obama stands in the light of continuity 
rather than change, he is beginning to shape his own approach. Distancing himself from 
the two George W. Bush administrations, Obama has conceded the existence of previous 
U.S. mistakes and now emphasizes mutual understanding and the non-coercive character 
of democracy (promotion). His administration has also changed the status of democracy 
promotion from signature issue to embedding it along with human rights promotion as 
part of a broader development policy framework. Especially in contrast to the time during 
which the Clinton administrations were operating, the Obama team faces circumstances 
that have a discouraging effect on any ardent democracy promotion efforts: the democ-
ratic euphoria of the 1990s, fueled by the end of the Cold War and democracy’s ‘third 
wave’, has given way to a debate about its global backlash, while the United States is con-
cerned with its own relative decline in light of new and aspiring rising powers on the 
world stage. As a consequence, Obama – in contrast to both his predecessors – draws 
heavily on the image of the U.S. as a ‘beacon’: promoting democracy by example. This 
may, in general, be the style he personally prefers; it is also fitting at a juncture where the 
U.S. lacks the resources and the credibility to promote democracy emphatically and on a 
large scale. Within this global context, Obama is careful not to have democracy promo-
tion stand in the way of his agenda of global reengagement, fostering constructive rela-
tionships with all kinds of regimes and thus eliciting democratic change in the long run, a 
strategy strongly criticized by adherents of the Bush strategy. Whether he will be success-
ful with his approach to democracy promotion within the foreign policy agenda remains 
to be seen. 
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1. Introduction1
When President George W. Bush left office in January 2009, his most prominent foreign 
policy project, the global promotion of democracy “with the ultimate goal of ending ty-
ranny in our world” (Bush 2005a), was beset with symptoms of crisis. President Bush had 
taken democracy promotion – at least at the level of rhetoric – to previously unknown 
heights in his ‘freedom agenda’, declaring it to be a, if not the, central tenet of the “War on 
Terror.” Upon his departure, this policy had caused estrangement and outright rejection 
in many parts of the world and was under severe attack domestically and internationally. 
Accordingly, during the final years of the second Bush administration, the scholarly and 
journalistic community diagnosed not only a backlash against democracy around the 
world, it also began investigating a backlash against democracy promotion.  
 
Recognizing the burden the Bush democracy promotion legacy constitutes for his suc-
cessor, many wonder ‘whither to, President Obama?’. Will his administration clearly 
break with its predecessor in this important foreign policy area or will it continue the 
latter’s general directions and substance, albeit assuming a more modest and low-key 
tone? One and a half years after Obama took office with his promises of change, the new 
president’s democracy promotion profile has not yet crystallized fully, and while some 
attest to the Obama administration’s continuity in this regard, others emphasize unequi-
vocal signs of change. Independent of whose assessment will be the right one in the end, 
the Obama administration’s positioning on democracy promotion is not only relevant to 
the overall make-up of U.S. foreign policy but also to the international enterprise of ex-
ternal democracy promotion.  
At this current crossroad, should we expect continuity or change in American democ-
racy promotion? In its attempt to offer a first perspective on a likely answer, this PRIF 
Report outlines the possible determinants of Obama’s approach by taking a closer look at 
this policy’s practice and rhetoric under the two presidencies that have designed and car-
ried out post-Cold-War democracy promotion. In order to decipher continuity and 
change, the main focus of attention will be on the why and how of U.S. democracy promo-
tion: the reasons and rationales for this policy as well as the means through which it is 
conducted. The officially voiced motivations for democracy promotion – the administra-
tions’ rhetoric – and how the presidencies went about spreading democracy will therefore 
be analyzed and compared. The larger context will be provided by a discussion of the 
significance of democracy promotion for U.S. foreign policy and history and its recent 
debates. Every in-coming administration has to position itself in regard to foreign policy 
concepts that either have a strong historical tradition and thus relevance for the nation’s 
identity or that have played a major role in the country’s foreign policy in the past years; 
in the case of democracy promotion, both applies.  
 
 
1 I would like to thank Stefanie Herr and Jonas Wolff for their valuable comments.  
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In order to illustrate the motivations for the United States’ emphasis on democracy 
promotion and how it was carried out as well as outline a likely road ahead, this PRIF 
Report will take the following approach: it will first trace the historic significance of this 
policy for U.S. national identity and discuss different positions on it that have taken shape 
over the last decades. Secondly, it will give an overview of how Obama’s two predecessors 
in office, Presidents Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and George W. Bush (2001-2009), who both 
favored a strong democracy promotion agenda, approached and handled this policy. It 
will, thirdly, identify and compare the official rationales for the promotion of democracy 
under these two presidencies. Finally, the Obama administration’s first moves will be 
explored tentatively, since a systematic study of its rationales is not yet possible. 
It is usually very informative to look at the past in order to understand the present and 
form an idea of what is likely to come in the future; this is even more the case with the 
United States whose political actors are famous for their frequent references to the coun-
try’s ‘founding fathers’ and their intentions as well as to what is perceived as a historically 
persistent American way of life. To be sure, the exact meaning of these references is highly 
contested, but actors of all political persuasions continuously underscore their signifi-
cance. Looking at the standing of democracy promotion in U.S. history and contempo-
rary thought as well as in recent political discourse will shed light on whether it is merely 
a foreign policy fad or is even intended to disguise so-called ‘hard interests’, or if it is or 
has become a part of the foreign policy canon across the partisan divide. Looking back 
will, for example, help shed light on the questions of whether the change from a Demo-
cratic to a Republican administration in 2001 brought about any substantial, perhaps even 
radical changes in this regard, whether external democracy promotion was mainly a spe-
cific project of the neo-conservatives in the Bush White House or an outgrowth of the 
“War on Terror”, and whether Obama, who ran on a ticket promising change, is likely to 
abandon the severely criticized project. 
Chapter 2 describes the major fault lines in the recent debate over American democra-
cy promotion and takes a look at this policy’s role and meaning in U.S. history. Since its 
inception, the United States has placed the promotion of democracy at the forefront of 
foreign policy goals (Monten 2005: 129-132; Smith 1994: 7). The country claiming to be 
God’s own and founded on the principles of democracy and human liberty first sought to 
enlighten the world through its representation as a ‘city upon a hill’ and later, having ex-
panded its territory, a stronger economy and more military power, actively tried to influ-
ence other country’s regimes, albeit with different means and with different outcomes. 
Bringing the light of freedom to peoples all over the world – a metaphor often used – has 
deep roots in the country’s perceived mission, and is a moral aim that all U.S. commenta-
tors on this issue subscribe to. Strong disagreements arise, however, over democracy 
promotion’s underlying rationale(s), its justifications and its consequences.  
The third chapter provides an overview of how the Clinton and Bush administrations 
approached and handled democracy promotion. The end of the Cold War advanced a 
new global wave of democratization and provided Western democracies with the oppor-
tunity to actively pursue their vision of a liberal, democratic and capitalistic world order 
(Geis/Brock/Müller 2007: 72). In this context, democracy promotion in the United States 
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as an explicit foreign policy goal – at least rhetorically – became increasingly important 
and has continued to be a consistent part of the foreign policy agenda up to the end of the 
second Bush administration. Both Clinton and Bush promoted the proposition that ex-
panding the ‘zone of democracies’ constituted one of the foundations of American foreign 
policy. Although the Clinton and Bush administrations are usually cited in terms of their 
differences rather than their similarities, democracy promotion in fact figured so promi-
nently on both presidents’ agendas that both have been likened to Wilsonianism and Pres-
ident Wilson’s quest to “make the world safe for democracy.”2
In chapter 4, an analysis of official documents and speeches by the American executive 
of the past two decades provides the tool for identifying the rationales that underlie the 
promotion of democracy. Why, according to the foreign policy elite, is democracy pro-
motion such a worthwhile goal, a goal the United States is and has been pursuing even 
against growing resistance and strong criticism?
  
3
 
 
2 The specter of Wilson haunts a large part of the literature on democracy promotion, despite 
Wilsonianism being an ever-contested and thus highly problematic term and “one of the most 
overused and misleading terms of the modern period” (Cox 2000: 222). For some serious and 
productive attempts to revisit Wilsonianism in the light of recent administrations, see for 
example: Cox 2000; Mazarr 2003. 
 What exactly is on the relevant officials’ 
minds is, however, not of concern here; politicians may very well use arguments only 
strategically and not believe in their merit. It is precisely their rhetoric that one needs to 
focus on because it reveals which lines of reasoning political representatives feel will reso-
nate best with the democratic audience they are accountable to, thus generating public 
support and legitimacy. It therefore seems reasonable to analyze the statements of high-
ranking officials in the executive branch that are broadly circulated in the general public. 
This chapter’s first part summarizes results and observations, whereas its second part 
offers an interpretation. The background and assessments provided by the literature on 
democracy promotion and the Clinton and Bush presidencies will be discussed and revis-
ited in light of the findings in the analysis – and will then form the backdrop against 
which the first moves by the Obama administration on democracy promotion, laid out in 
chapter 5, are assessed. Finally, the sixth chapter offers concluding remarks as well as an 
outlook on the future of U.S. democracy promotion.  
3 Depending on a speaker’s intent, democracy promotion is either presented as a policy goal (an 
end) or as a policy instrument (a means) serving a higher objective; very often it is considered 
to be both, and no distinction is made. 
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2. Foreign policy panacea or idealist window-dressing? 
U.S. democracy promotion in history and 
contemporary thought 
Democracy promotion comprises an “array of measures aimed at establishing, streng-
thening, or defending democracy in a given country” and thus involves political actions as 
diverse as diplomatic pressure, tying foreign aid to certain conditions, sanctions and the 
use of military force (Azpuru et al 2008: 151). Consequently, a political representative 
merely addressing the need for democratic change during a visit in a non-democratic 
country falls under the broad definition of democracy promotion as does a military inter-
vention in the name of defending or building democracy. One specific form of democracy 
promotion is democracy assistance, which refers to “funds or direct assistance to govern-
ments, institutions, or civil society actors” (ibid.) working towards establishing or streng-
thening democracy. After the end of the Cold War, the democracy and governance budg-
et allocated through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) – 
the most important distributor of democracy assistance – has steadily grown in size and 
done so, significantly, under both the Clinton and Bush presidencies.4
One cause of disagreement is the question of whether democracy promotion should be 
pursued by actively interfering in other countries or passively by leading through exam-
ple. The notion of democracy promotion through exemplarism predates the nation’s 
founding and has religious origins. Preacher John Winthrop is the first on record to have 
expressed the continent’s unique position as a leading example to the unenlightened parts 
of the world. In his famous sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity”, he refers to the 
American colonies as a “city upon a hill” (Winthrop 1630). The first president, George 
Washington, in his Farewell Address in 1796 echoes the United States’ function as a role 
model: 
 It is widely agreed 
that the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy goal is deeply rooted in American 
historical tradition and is part of what is often referred to as ‘American exceptionalism’. 
Whereas there is a basic historical consensus on why democracy promotion should be on 
the foreign policy agenda in principle, how this policy should be pursued remains deeply 
controversial. 
“It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period, a great nation, to give to 
mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted 
justice and benevolence.” (Washington 1796) 
 
 
4 USAID’s democracy assistance, in constant (2000) dollars, has increased from $128 million in 
1990 to $902 million in 2005. Previously only a minor part of USAID outlays, the portion of the 
USAID budget dedicated to democracy initiatives had become the most important even before 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq called for higher expenditures. Moreover, the scope of de-
mocracy assistance has expanded (Azpuru et al 2008). 
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For about two centuries, the unique American mission expressed by the religious meta-
phor of a shining “city on a hill” dominated the idea of democracy promotion, while the 
notion of a more active involvement with the outside world was regularly rejected. In his 
Independence Day Address in 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams stated in un-
equivocal terms that democracy promotion was to be a passive endeavor: 
“Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there 
will her [America’s, AEP] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not 
abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and indepen-
dence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the 
general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her exam-
ple.” (Adams 1821) 
The sentiment of America’s unique system and character, the necessity to protect these 
and their functioning as a beacon for the rest of the world also found its way into foreign 
policy-related documents such as the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the concept of Manifest 
Destiny in 1839, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points in 1918 as well as the Atlantic Char-
ter in 1941. Hence, those who see democracy promotion as an essential part of American 
foreign policy from its earliest beginnings onward certainly have an impressive host of 
crucial actors and major documents to refer to.   
The ‘sense of mission’ to spread and defend freedom and democracy around the world 
– although religious in its origins – is more relevant today as a civil-religious impulse, 
which is especially important with regard to generating identity and cohesion within the 
American nation-state (Brocker 2006: 216). Calvinism and the Enlightenment are two 
important sources for America’s democratic mission, which originated “not only in the 
instrumental maximization of some material interest, but in a moral commitment to the 
universal political values that define the United States as a self-contained political com-
munity” (Monten 2005: 120). As a consequence, today’s moral fervor with regard to 
American democracy promotion most probably stems from this religious tradition (Nau 
2000: 148). Regardless of how democracy promotion has taken shape over the centuries, 
commentators unanimously consider it to be central to U.S. political identity and its sense 
of national purpose. 
Exactly how the democratization impulse has taken shape is often framed within “two 
competing theories of democracy promotion” (Monten 2005: 114): beacon and crusader, 
exemplarism and vindicationism (Monten 2005), exemplar nation and crusader state 
(Brocker 2006: 217-18). Monten argues that periods of activist democracy promotion can 
be explained by a convergence of a rise in material capabilities along with the presence of 
a nationalist domestic ideology that favors vindicationism over exemplarism; the two 
examples he cites are the 1890s and the Bush presidency. The latter, in his view, 
represents the perfect vindicationist storm (Monten 2005: 140). Brocker adds to the active 
mode of a crusader state and the passive mode of the exemplar nation the most common 
of all cases: rhetorical emphasis on America’s special mission and her global responsibility 
for freedom and democracy with the sole purpose of putting a suitable and widely ac-
cepted label on the pursuance of other interests. His examples are Reagan’s “crusade for 
freedom” and Bush’s attempt to legitimize the 2003 Iraq war (Brocker 2006). 
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When did the formerly exemplarist democracy promotion impulse take a more active 
turn? The presidency of Woodrow Wilson and his call to “make the world safe for de-
mocracy” in 1917 is often referred to as the beginning of a period of active democracy 
promotion in American history. Sometimes the beginning of an active liberal mission is 
dated to the Spanish-American war in 1898; most authors, however, see the first serious 
attempts under the Carter or Reagan administrations. In terms of why democracy should 
be promoted, rationales – beyond the idealistic missionary impulse – were augmented 
during the Wilson administration, which considered international security and prosperity 
as one welcome result of this policy. The most significant boost of democracy promo-
tion’s legitimacy, however, came after the end of the Cold War, which seemed to provide 
the “liberal momentum” for a significantly more feasible and promising implementation 
of democratization worldwide (Geis/Brock/Müller 2007: 72). Responding to what was 
perceived as democracy euphoria and with the assumed backing of ‘democratic peace 
theory’ from the political sciences, Clinton attempted to elevate democracy promotion to 
the status of a national grand strategy and thereby replace the strategy of containment.  
The democratic peace thesis, as it was received by policymakers, broadened the argu-
mentative basis for democracy promotion up to the point where this policy was consi-
dered to be a foreign policy panacea. It holds that democracies do not fight each other,5 
and, although this phenomenon has not been satisfactorily explained and the scholarly 
community is still debating the implications of this finding, most policymakers have ab-
sorbed the following logic: the fact that democracies do not fight each other leads to – in 
proportion to the number of states the democratic community calls its own – greater sta-
bility in the international system, and thus to global peace and prosperity. Democracy 
promotion, consequently, fosters not only ‘global well-being’, but also bolsters the nation-
al security interests and economic benefits of one’s own country. During the Clinton pres-
idency “possibly no other idea emanating from the academic community exercised as 
much influence as this one [democratic peace, AEP] on the White House” (Cox 2000: 
226). More pronounced than ever before, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of 
democratic peace theory allowed for the conceivably smooth merging of normative im-
pulses and rationalist reasoning within the promotion of democracy.6
The notion of American exceptionalism has also shaped a fairly optimistic American 
liberal tradition, which has been an influential current in U.S. political thought and was 
rekindled after the end of the Cold War. The basic premises of this belief system are (1) 
the conviction that development, including the promotion of liberalism, is a relatively 
smooth process; (2) that “all good things go together”, such as the improvement of the 
economy and the strengthening of democracy, the merger of U.S. values and vital inter-
   
 
 
5 Democracies are, however, just as often engaged in military conflict with non-democracies as 
are non-democracies with each other. This constitutes the so-called “dual finding of ‘democra-
tic peace’ and ‘warlike democracies’” (Risse-Kappen 1995: 492). 
6 For criticism of democratic peace theory’s implications and its activist adoption, see for 
example: Farrell 2000; Geis/Brock/Müller 2007; Schweller 2000. 
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ests, or the assertion that democratizing Iraq will benefit American security; (3) the pre-
mise that radicalism and revolution in principal are undesirable and need to be coun-
tered; and (4) finally, the belief that strengthening democracy is more important than 
maintaining stability (Desch 2007/08: 20-25). Whereas the liberal tradition is not the only 
point of reference and certainly not unchallenged, it represents an influential current 
among the foreign policy making elite and has, consequently, shaped the promotion of 
democracy abroad. 
Looking at democracy promotion during the Cold War is instructive for highlighting 
the debate between those who see democracy promotion as a serious and activist tradition 
and those who see it as cheap talk, as well as between those who perceive democracy pro-
motion as compatible or even identical with the country’s national interest and those who 
identify severe conflicts. Tony Smith (1994: 3) falls into the former camp as he argues that 
democracy promotion was not only the cutting edge of America’s rise to world-power 
status, it was also “the central ambition of American foreign policy during the 20th cen-
tury”; an ambition whose relentless pursuit eventually won the Cold War for the United 
States and the democratic cause. Many scholars point out that after World War II the 
United States successfully managed to reconstruct a democratic Germany and Japan as 
well as forge a community of liberal democracies whose existence has outlived the Cold 
War (Nau 2000: 142). Smith is also convinced that Wilsonianism and realism have been 
made compatible through democracy promotion and that “the argument that nothing 
serves American national security like the expansion of democracy worldwide can be 
made historically, empirically, and logically” (Smith 1994: 332, 32).  
Many authors vehemently disagree with this positive – some call it triumphalist – 
overall interpretation of U.S. history during the Cold War. These authors submit that the 
rhetoric on democracy promotion might have been impressive but the record was less 
consistent (Carothers 1999: 3), forming a glaring gap between words and deeds.7
 
 
7 Among those authors who argue that democracy promotion reality has never lived up to its 
promises and that this policy has often clashed and subsequently been subordinate to other 
interests are: Goldsmith 2008, Schmitz 2006, S. Smith 2000.  
 Contain-
ing communism, in the view of many, took clear precedence over the goal of promoting 
democracy (Schmitz 2006: 2). Farrell (2000: 584) calls the American record on democracy 
promotion during the Cold War “dreadful” and asserts that democracy was only pro-
moted where it coincided with other interests but was discarded altogether whenever it 
got in the way. Likewise, Schmitz (2006: 1, 242) sees a still unresolved contradiction be-
tween American values and ideals on the one hand and American security and material 
interests on the other. In his analysis of U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships during 
the Cold War, he finds little to corroborate Tony Smith’s positive assessment; supporting 
right-wing dictatorships was justified by the aims of providing stability, fostering U.S. 
economic interests, ensuring American security and even – as a long term goal – support-
ing freedom (Schmitz: 2006: 3-4). The inherent conflict between the support of brutal 
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regimes and the articulated intent to spread democracy and freedom by doing so even-
tually made the policy untenable. Nowhere does Schmitz find reason to believe that de-
mocracy promotion and other American values ever took precedence over other interests 
during the Cold War. On the contrary, he asserts that the employment of covert action 
and military interventions undermined democratic developments and that U.S. policy 
overall hurt American interests and morale in the long run (Schmitz 2006: 6-7).  
With a view to the role of democracy promotion after the Cold War, Carothers offers a 
summary of what seems to be the majority opinion among scholars: 
“Democracy promotion remains at most one of several major US foreign policy interests, 
sometimes complementary to but sometimes in competition with other, stronger interests. 
Nevertheless, the promotion of democracy is playing an important role in US foreign poli-
cy.” (Carothers 1999: 5) 
Monten adds to this assessment that there is a tendency among Americans to conflate 
American interests with what are thought to be common international interests. In this 
view, the political values and institutions that have traditionally defined U.S. national 
identity are universal and exportable. This perspective might also account for the lack of 
humility in exercising power (Monten 2005: 144-48). 
Two concepts inseparable from the question of a possible convergence of ideals and 
interests are often and eagerly debated in the literature on democracy promotion, and 
many authors have expressed their intention to overcome the divide between the two: 
idealism and realism, “the two dominant perspectives on the conduct of foreign affairs” 
(Holsti 2000: 153). The idealistic position in American foreign policy emphasizes the spe-
cial mission and moral responsibility the United States has for the world and the optimis-
tic belief in the possibility of constant improvement, eventually leading to a world pros-
perous and at peace. Liberty, democracy, and human rights are considered concepts that 
all human beings aspire to as the conditions that enable their happiness and self-
improvement. Democracy as a foreign policy objective, in this view, takes on a central role 
for the United States, either by staying out of foreign affairs and offering the world an 
example as democracy is perfected at home (the isolationist-passive variant), or by pro-
moting it abroad and thereby transforming world affairs for the better (the international-
ist-activist variant) (Holsti 2000: 153-157; Nau 2000: 127). 
The realist perspective on democracy promotion in summary is the following: Regard-
less of the inner constitution of a nation-state, “in an anarchic world characterized by 
scarce material and social resources, states must engage in positional competition for 
power and influence” (Schweller 2000: 52); the best a state can do is to defend and pursue 
its national interest while soberly balancing risks and rewards as well as relevant re-
sources; the norms of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of oth-
er states should be respected in order not to further increase the international system’s 
lack of order and security; finally, even if realists do agree upon the desirability of demo-
cratic reform of other countries, they usually do not regard it as feasible to impose values 
and practices that are not indigenous (Holsti 2000: 155; Nau 2000: 127). 
Many authors emphatically argue that the divide between idealism and realism has fi-
nally been crossed by the foreign policy concept of democracy promotion (Carothers 
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2000b, Holsti 2000). In Carothers’ words: “The end of the cold war gave rise to the appeal-
ing notion that the traditional tension in U.S. foreign policy between realpolitik security 
interests and Wilsonian moral interests was over” (Carothers 1999: 4-5, his emphasis). 
Spreading democracy around the world, now that it appeared more feasible than under 
the restrictions of the Cold War’s bipolar confrontation, seemed after all to offer a multi-
tude of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ benefits: it satisfied the assumed societal demands for an idealistic 
policy in line with the American self-image while at the same time pacifying the world 
and thereby enhancing U.S. security and economic opportunities. The security logic of 
democracy promotion in particular can only be appreciated when one moves beyond the 
realism/idealism dichotomy (Nau 2000: 127). Whereas the theoretical debate has been 
productive in this regard, putting democracy into practice in non-democratic countries 
and reaping its benefits has been, not surprisingly, more complicated and less successful.  
Whether American democracy promotion has been effective or not is another field of 
debate in which the cautionary have obtained the upper hand. Several studies on democ-
racy promotion in Latin America have shown that past attempts had little enduring suc-
cess (Lowenthal 1991). A study on the democracy-building effects of USAID assistance 
from 1990 to 2003 concludes that it has had a “moderate but consistent worldwide effect” 
but its authors emphasize a number of qualificatory observations (Finkel/Pérez-
Liñán/Seligson 2007: 436).8
According to Carothers, effects often fail to materialize because a lot of well-meaning 
aides confuse American democracy with liberal democracy itself. The two main misun-
derstandings which lead to failure, he points out, are the assumption that democracy is a 
formal set of procedures which can be imposed on any kind of system regardless of prior 
democratic experience and norms on the one hand, and the premise that the democracy 
to be promoted needs a ‘made in the United States’ label in order to function on the other 
(Carothers 2000a). Lowenthal adds that “efforts to nurture it [democracy, AEP] must be 
restrained, respectful, sensitive, and patient. These are not qualities for which U.S. foreign 
policy is generally noted, but they are needed to promote democracy abroad” (Lowenthal 
1991: 402). 
 Recently, the emerging literature discussing the global back-
lash against democracy and democracy promotion has added to the impression that ex-
ternal democratization is not performing well and is even fueling a countermovement 
(Carothers 2006; NED 2006). 
The area in which this kind of restraint, sensitivity and patience is probably least 
present is the one in which democracy has been promoted through military means. This 
is important to note as there has been a shift towards militarily imposed democracy since 
 
 
8 Apart from outlining the difficulties in making a valid assessment and the complexity of the 
causation process, the authors point out that “U.S. democracy assistance pales relative to other 
U.S. development assistance, relative to per capita development assistance provided by many 
other advanced industrial nations, and, most starkly, relative to the sums expended to 
democratize nations via military intervention” (Finkel/Pérez-Liñán/Seligson 2007: 436). 
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the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Muravchik is convinced that during the 
Cold War “military occupation and covert action have been highly effective means of 
spreading democracy” (Muravchik 1991: 222-23). To the contrary, as a study covering the 
time period from 1946 to 1996 has shown, most interventions by liberal states have failed 
to lead to successful democratization in target countries; only supportive interventions by 
United Nations blue helmet troops seem to have limited effectiveness (Pickering/Peceny 
2006). As will be shown in the following chapter, the attempt to promote democracy by 
force is a characteristic the Bush administration has become known – and strongly criti-
cized – for.  
3. Democracy promotion from Clinton to Bush 
3.1 The Clinton presidency – geoeconomics via democracy promotion? 
“It’s the economy, stupid!” was one of Bill Clinton’s highly successful campaign slogans 
for the 1992 presidential election, which he won against his predecessor George H.W. 
Bush, who was renowned for his foreign policy successes. In a world now suddenly lack-
ing the framework the Cold War had offered for many decades, candidate and early Pres-
ident Clinton was indeed slow to develop his own foreign policy profile and was hence 
strongly criticized. During his election campaign, Clinton had only vaguely outlined three 
major foreign policy goals: “[...] updating and restructuring American military and securi-
ty capabilities, elevating the role of economics in international affairs, and promoting 
democracy abroad” (Brinkley 1997: 112). In August 1993 he asked his staff to devise a 
strategic vision with an accompanying catch-phrase. These so-called ‘Kennan Sweeps-
takes’9
The concept of enlargement never did catch on, let alone become America’s new grand 
strategy (Travis 1998: 270). The lack of public enthusiasm for democracy promotion or 
even for foreign policy in general, the greater latitude that interest groups and Congress 
consequently had, polarized party politics after the so-called ‘Republican Revolution’
 were won by the term ‘enlargement’: “enlargement of the world’s free community 
of market democracies” (Lake 1993). Clinton and his staff hoped that democratic en-
largement would catch on and eventually replace ‘containment’ as the new grand strategy 
after the Cold War.  
10
 
 
9 Diplomat and policy advisor George F. Kennan had delivered the grand strategy catch-phrase 
for the period after 1945 – ‘containment’ – whose replacement the Clinton team was now 
seeking. Thus the search process was granted the title ‘Kennan Sweepstakes’. 
 as 
well as personal animosities all worked against the Clinton administration’s attempt to 
10 The Republican Revolution refers to the 1994 mid-term elections, after which the Republican 
Party took over the majority of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
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forge a new foreign policy consensus around the enlargement concept. Critics of the ad-
ministration felt that the inexperienced Clinton had fallen for “the old Wilsonian fallacy” 
(Cox 2000: 219) – idealistic policies unfit for the real world and dangerously compromis-
ing national security (Wiarda 1997: 12). Although these charges are unwarranted for the 
most part (Cox 2000), in response to criticism the administration had to scale back their 
enlargement efforts, though never losing sight of them completely. Three key adjustments 
to the strategy of enlargement were made: while high-profile rhetoric was maintained, the 
administration ceased to push its strategy as a priority; it shifted emphasis from democra-
cy promotion to free market promotion, which was more acceptable to many opponents 
in Congress; and the continuing efforts to promote democracy assumed a lower profile 
(Travis 1998: 262-65). 
The linkage between promoting democracy and promoting free market systems is of 
major concern to many authors. The Clinton-coined term ‘market democracy’ was deli-
berately created in order to show that promoting democracy and promoting market 
economies were two inseparable concepts, “that there was a symbiotic and positive rela-
tionship between market forms and political democracy” (Cox 2000: 232-33). Exactly how 
this mutually enforcing relationship worked and manifested itself was never clearly elabo-
rated (Smith 2000: 78). Wiarda (1997: 16) interprets the connection between democracy 
and free market capitalism as follows: the promotion of open markets and free trade im-
proves a recipient country’s economy, raises its people’s living standard and creates a 
middle class, thereby enhancing the state’s stability and the chances for democratization. 
Reciprocally, democracy promotion ensures stability and moderation which is needed to 
foster a climate conducive to foreign investment, open markets and free trade.  
Not surprisingly, then, this apparently uncritical merging of promoting democracy 
and free markets was and still remains widely disputed. Whereas some insist that the 
causal connections between democracy and economic development are still inconclusive, 
others wonder whether it was concern for democracy or concern for the economy that 
took the ‘driver’s seat’ in Clinton’s enlargement concept (Smith 2000). Contrary to those 
who argue that “enlargement was about spreading democracy through promoting the 
gospel of geoeconomics” (Brinkley 1997: 125, Smith 2000: 78) perceives democracy pro-
motion as subordinate to a neo-liberal economic agenda. Smith and Cox (2000: 225) 
agree that “for the Clinton administration geoeconomics replaced geopolitics as the cen-
tral foreign policy goal” (Smith 2000: 78) and that in order to pursue this goal a coherent 
strategy was indeed devised, thus refuting the argument that Clinton was lacking in vi-
sion. 
Clinton may have had a vision and may have been a believer in the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
benefits democracy promotion offered, but – contrary to many critics’ charges – he was 
not a foolish missionary zealot. Clinton and his staff were not interested in pursuing the 
enlargement strategy for the sake of idealistic missions. Being a “pragmatic Neo-
Wilsonianist” or a “pragmatic crusader”, Clinton was not willing to place democratization 
above other goals but considered it to be one objective among a number of others which 
were aimed at consolidating America’s hegemonic standing in the international system 
12 Annika E. Poppe 
 
 
(Cox 2000: 228, Travis 1998: 263). In other words, promoting democracy was not a moral 
duty but a policy instrument to advance American power (Cox 2000: 221). 
Consequently, American business efforts in the international economy were more im-
portant to the president, who also made clear that democracy promotion was only one 
(small) contributor to national security, which would still be pursued through traditional 
means (Carothers 2003: 96; Cox 2000: 229-230). Democracy promotion was hence one 
promising strategy among many others. Accordingly, it has been pointed out that Clinton 
acted as a selective liberal democratic internationalist, who would stop short of using mili-
tary force for the sake of democracy or human rights abroad – with the exception of the 
multilateral intervention in Haiti as well as the U.S. involvement in Somalia, the latter of 
which seriously backfired (Smith 1994: 325-26).  
Not only was the Clinton administration (increasingly) reluctant to become militarily 
active for democracy promotion, it was also mainly focused on those nations already well 
engaged in the democratization process by themselves. The allocation of democracy assis-
tance reflects this focus, as the main aid recipients were Latin American countries and 
countries in the former Soviet sphere (Azpuru et al 2008: 154). Several statements of Clin-
ton representatives, among them Strobe Talbott, underline this policy direction:  
“Henry Clay articulated a standard that holds up today: ‘I would not force upon other na-
tions our principles and our liberty, if they did not want them. But, if an abused and op-
pressed people will their freedom; if they seek to establish it; if, in truth, they have estab-
lished it; we have a right, as a sovereign power, to notice the fact, and to act as our 
circumstances and our interest require.’” (Talbott 1996) 
Madeleine Albright (2000b) points to the importance of renewing the democratic mo-
mentum in states which have gotten stuck in their progress. And Anthony Lake (1993), 
addressing policy towards “backlash states” unwilling to reform, outlines the administra-
tion’s strategic objective to “seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, 
and technologically”. Apparently, democratic reform was not to be forced upon those 
outside the already existing community of (newly developing) democracies. As will be 
shown, these statements stand in sharp contrast to the Bush administrations’ calls to ei-
ther reform or eradicate those opposed to liberalism and democracy. 
Overall, it is thus reasonable to argue that Clinton’s foreign policy, while certainly 
lacking contours in the beginning, followed a fairly traditional set of interests, such as 
consolidating American hegemonic standing in the world through economic engagement, 
while not falling prey to the post-Cold War lure of a democratist crusade to reshape the 
world after America’s own image and ideals. Yet, idealist notions were not irrelevant. 
Brinkley summarizes Clinton’s foreign policy as “pragmatic realism first, idealism always 
a close second” (Brinkley: 1997: 127), whereas Carothers speaks of the rediscovery of 
semi-realism (Carothers 2000b). 
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3.2 The Bush presidency – fighting terror via democracy promotion? 
If one is inclined to pick a main theme for the presidency of Bill Clinton, it would proba-
bly be the economy; for Bush one would probably choose the issue of national security. 
Whereas Clinton won the election campaign with a focus on the economy, economic 
concerns ranked as a top priority during his two administrations, and he is – accurately or 
not – often remembered as presiding over a ‘golden age’, it is concerns about America’s 
security that have left the most noticeable imprint on the Bush presidency, and his dealing 
with the issue will likely be what he will be remembered for. Unilateralism, withdrawal 
from international treaties, the doctrine of preemption, the fight between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, 
and the “War on Terror” – primarily manifesting itself in the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq – are probably the most-frequently discussed concepts and points of discussion re-
garding the Bush presidency (Fukuyama/McFaul 2007/08). Democracy promotion as a 
foreign policy strategy and objective also played a crucial role as manifested by the presi-
dent’s proclaimed ‘freedom agenda’. But, compared to the Clinton presidency’s economic 
focus, the agenda’s emphasis had shifted noticeably. 
In the early months of the Bush presidency, however, democracy promotion seemed to 
be in danger of getting the ax (Carothers 2003: 84). During his election campaign, Bush 
had made it clear that he would reduce foreign policy commitments to defending tradi-
tional and vital interests and would not fall for any of the idealistic notions he accused the 
Clinton team of; realistic thinking would re-enter the White House (Carothers 2003: 84; 
Jervis 2003: 365). But the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forced the administra-
tion to fundamentally reconsider America’s national security, a process at whose end 
stood democracy promotion’s elevation as a central objective in what came to be known 
as the Bush Doctrine (Goldsmith 2008: 120). This new foreign policy agenda’s framework 
was developed and presented in statements from June to September 2002, culminating in 
the National Security Strategy of September 17, 2002 (Smith 2007: 2). Jervis succinctly 
outlines the Bush Doctrine’s four central elements as follows:  
“[...] a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its foreign 
policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international 
politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous poli-
cies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as 
both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability re-
quire the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.” (Jervis 2003: 365) 
The Bush Doctrine has stirred up high waves in academic debate and has found only a 
few enthusiastic followers there. Tony Smith, whose outlook on America’s democracy 
promotion capabilities and successes turned rather bleak under the Bush government, 
criticizes that the Bush Doctrine offers “the stark choice [...] between a ‘benevolent’ 
American hegemony over the international system, with imperialism against those who 
thwarted America’s grand design, or chaos and the march of the barbarians” (Smith 
2007: 3). This imperially inclined hegemon is, as the administration has made clear, very 
much willing to use force if it is considered necessary. The administration is also respon-
sible for creating the impression that military intervention is the only democracy promo-
tion instrument when in fact it is the rarest of all instruments as well as the least likely to 
succeed (Fukuyama/McFaul 2007/08: 34). 
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The argument discussed most frequently with regard to democracy promotion under 
Bush – and usually in connection with the choice of military means – is the supposition 
that spreading democracy is not only a good way of enhancing America’s national securi-
ty in general, but, more concretely, a viable counterterrorism strategy. It is especially the 
Middle East that the administration has focused on in this regard, and the wars in Afgha-
nistan and Iraq have, accordingly, brought about the sharpest change in democracy 
spending since the end of the Cold War, as the assistance budget for both countries rose 
dramatically (Azpuru et al 2008: 155). President Bush’s 2006 National Strategy for Com-
bating Terrorism highlights, as the first among six strategies aimed at winning the “War 
on Terror”, the necessity to “advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to 
the ideology of terrorism”.11
Whereas Clinton was accused of being too idealistic in his foreign policy designs and 
was exonerated by many commentators, it appears to be the reverse in the case of Bush. 
The Bush team has repeatedly claimed that its policymaking is firmly grounded in the 
realist tradition (Mazarr 2003: 503), a claim that many scholars have endeavored to refute. 
One of them has tested the basic premises of realism against the worldview that the Presi-
dent and his representatives have conveyed in their statements and finds them to be clear-
ly inclined towards idealistic notions (Mazarr 2003). Bush’s foreign policy agenda, in fact, 
“horrifies Realists (and perhaps realists)” (Jervis 2003: 366), whereas it shows character 
traits that justify labeling it “Wilsonianism with a vengeance” (Rhodes 2003: 133) and 
putting it squarely in the liberal tradition (Desch 2007/08: 37). Carothers (2003: 84) and 
Diamond (2007: 10) agree that two contradictory imperatives produce tension in Bush’s 
proclaimed foreign policy: the realist imperative to foster good relations with ‘friendly 
tyrants’ in order to maintain stability and order is in conflict with the neo-Reaganite im-
pulse to promote and strengthen democratic systems around the world. Rhodes (2003) 
strikes a similar note when he explains that the Bush Doctrine is imperial but liberal and 
claims that this tension lies at the heart of the president’s foreign policy.  
 Larry Diamond is one of the few authors following this line 
of argumentation as he evokes “‘a long twilight struggle’ against the enemies of freedom” 
to be won in the long run by promoting democracy, which will “undermine, isolate, and 
ultimately defeat radical islamist terrorism” (Diamond 2007: 1, 9). Although Diamond 
agrees with the president’s framing of the problem and of the solutions, he – as do many 
others – laments that Bush “has been disastrously wrong in the unilateral, blunt and 
blundering means with which he has tried to bring it about”, abandoning democratic 
commitments made with pompous rhetoric whenever difficulties arose (Diamond 
2007: 9-10).  
 
 
11 The White House: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2006. A 2007 White House Fact 
Sheet entitled “Advancing Freedom and Democracy Around the World” also insists: “Expand-
ing Freedom Is More Than A Moral Imperative – It Is The Only Realistic Way To Protect Our 
People. The 9/11 attacks were evidence of an international movement of violent Islamic 
extremists that threatens free people everywhere. Nations that commit to freedom for their 
people will not support extremists; they will join in defeating them.” 
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The Bush administration’s ‘freedom agenda’ has also led a few scholars to revisit the 
meaning and implications of liberalism. In light of what many consider illiberal excesses 
of American (foreign) policy12
“Democracies are janus-faced. While they do not fight each other, they are frequently in-
volved in militarized disputes and wars with authoritarian regimes. [...] To a large degree 
democracies create their friends and enemies – “us” and “them” – by inferring either defen-
sive or aggressive motives from the domestic structures of their counterparts.” (Risse-
Kappen 1995: 491) 
 and the president’s supposedly imperial designs, scholars 
have pointed again to the illiberal dangers that are inherent in liberalism (Desch 2007/08; 
Geis 2006). But while recent U.S. policies have offered a vivid example of illiberal policies, 
all liberal democracies can potentially fall for it:  
Rhetoric and politics of recent U.S. counterterrorism may serve as marked examples, but 
the creation of strong enemy images and illiberal measures are a pitfall that all Western 
democracies face. In order to expand the institutions and the scope of the security state, 
“the construction of ‘others’ that are presented as threats to a society in principle lies in 
the self-interest of all democratic governments” (Geis 2006: 155, her emphasis). 
Michael Desch, who demonstrates that the Bush administration fully embraced libe-
ralism’s basic premises (see chapter 2), posits that these same principles – and not, as 
widely accepted, the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001 – are responsible for the 
administration’s illiberal policies.13
 
 
12 Authors highlight, for example, the indefinite detention of presumed terrorists at Guantánamo 
Bay, the rendition campaign and torture practices, and unauthorized wiretapping (Desch 
2007/08: 7; Fukuyama/Mc Faul 2007/08: 34-35). 
 From a traditional American liberal point of view, 
threats stemming from non-liberal forces appear unrealistically large whereas the chal-
lenges to promote liberalism are considered unrealistically small. Threats from non-
liberal aggressors such as terrorists, accordingly, cannot be contained or otherwise ma-
naged but need to be eliminated; either through annihilation or spreading democracy so 
far the terrorists no longer find fertile ground for their intentions (Desch 2007/08: 25-26). 
Desch reasons that “given Liberalism’s dire view of the threat posed by non-liberal cur-
rents and its radical prescriptions for how to deal with these threats, it is not surprising 
that illiberal policies would be the result” (Desch 2007/08: 27). It also follows from liberal-
ism that its norms are self-evident and that there is no legitimate reason to reject them, 
which is why the Bush administration considers any attack on the free world to either 
stem from “moral defect or malign intent” (Desch 2007/08: 32; Geis 2006: 150-52). 
Desch’s argumentation hence offers an explanation for the president’s and his administra-
tion’s inclination to present the world in pointedly dichotomous terms and the concep-
13 Similarly, Rhodes (2003: 149) warns that “the real tragedy for America is likely to be that the 
pursuit of liberal imperium conflicts with its own republican values. A liberal democratic 
republic may pursue imperial dominance, but in gaining the whole world it loses its own soul.” 
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tual basis for the oft-cited remark “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” 
(Bush 2001a).14
The overall assessment of (not only) democracy promotion under Bush turns out to be 
harshly negative (Goldsmith 2008: 121). Again, just as with the Clinton administration, 
rhetoric never lived up to reality; but then the Bush administration’s rhetoric also far ex-
ceeded Clinton’s, creating the impression that his foreign policy was one of “democracy 
promotion on steroids” (Carothers 2007a: 11). The administration’s blustering rhetoric 
has even hurt American interests abroad as it gambled away credibility and triggered anti-
American responses (Fukuyama/McFaul 2007/08: 36). And substantive efforts going 
beyond the use of rhetoric – most prominently the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as 
the significant increase in financial democracy aid
  
15 – have failed to enlarge the number of 
people living in freedom (Fukuyama/McFaul 2007/08: 24). Even worse, talk of a world-
wide democratic rollback as well as a democracy promotion backlash emerged.16
3.3 The two post-Cold War presidencies compared 
 The 
charge of promoting double standards is frequently voiced, often in connection with 
pointing out the good and thriving relations between the Bush government and dictator-
ships (Carothers 2003: 84; Schmitz 2006: 243). Consequently, the image of Bush having 
embarked on a democracy crusade that is sometimes evoked is a myth.  
With regard to means considered and used for democracy promotion, the Clinton record 
is – in clear contrast to the Bush presidency – one of military restraint. Hand in hand with 
this observation goes the more restricted group of addressees of democracy assistance 
under the Clinton presidency. Whereas – by implication more than by explicit articula-
tion – the Clinton team sought to assist nations either with a somewhat (pre-)democratic 
structure or nations that themselves took the initiative to pursue reform, Bush explicitly 
extended the circle of addressees to those quite unwilling to democratize and even in-
cluded the so-called ‘rogue states’. This observation along with the Bush administrations’ 
 
 
14 This statement was reiterated at least once later that year: “You are either with us or you are 
against us in the fight against terror” (Bush 2001b).   
15 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were publicly only ex-post justified as being about bringing 
democracy to oppressed peoples, but the Bush administration insists that this goal was decisive 
(and in the case of Iraq Desch concurs: 2008: 37). As Goldsmith (2008: 121) reports, financial 
aid for democracy promotion in 2000 was $500 million per year; the 2008 budget request for 
democracy promotion and human rights rose to $1.5 billion. 
16 Carothers 2006; NED 2006. In June 2007, the Washington Post offered a bleak summary of the 
state of U.S. democracy promotion: ever since Bush had made it a key to U.S. long-term securi-
ty, democracy had suffered considerable setbacks in the Middle East as well as Latin America 
and Russia; the administration has lost its credibility on the issue; and (semi-)authoritarian 
governments now respond more quickly and more morosely to American rebukes with regard 
to the lack or pace of democratic progress (Wright 2007). 
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Manichean inclinations and their harsh rejection of the illiberal ‘other’ allows the style of 
democracy promotion under Bush to be characterized as confrontational, an assessment 
that is well corroborated by the president’s general penchant for unilateralism in foreign 
policy. In contrast, Clinton’s more reserved, consensual approach in promoting democra-
cy goes hand in hand with his inclination towards a multilateral foreign policy stance in 
general. In terms of argumentative reasoning for democracy promotion, scholars have 
picked their favorite point of discussion for each administration: economic benefits for 
Clinton and keeping America safe for Bush. It remains to be seen in the following chapter 
whether the alleged importance of these lines of argument for democracy promotion is 
reflected in statements made by the respective administrations. 
4. Fulfilling America’s global mission and keeping her safe 
4.1 The official rationales for democracy promotion under the Clinton and 
Bush administrations 
This chapter mainly focuses on why democracy was to be promoted; it discusses and in-
terprets the results of a qualitative content analysis of public statements made by officials 
of the Clinton and Bush administrations with regard to the reasons given in favor of the 
promotion of democracy.17
 
 
17 The methodological approach was the following: secondary literature was scanned for hints 
and traces of conceivable – not necessarily actually voiced – arguments for American democra-
cy promotion. This fairly comprehensive collection was then broken down into suitable 
categories. In order to ensure that important arguments had not been missed, the category 
scheme was used in a pilot study on a few sample speeches, and additional lines of argument 
were incorporated. The category scheme and codebook resulting from this process were then 
applied to 56 public statements from each presidency. Political actors under survey were the 
presidents, the secretaries of state, as well as other administration officials who have made 
notable statements on the promotion of democracy. 
 The main question is: what do the speakers believe resonates 
best with – and thereby creates support among – the American people? The actors under 
analysis are accountable to the electorate and have to justify and gain support for their 
actions. Hence the assumption is that they will choose arguments they deem to be most 
plausible and convincing to their audience.  
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Frequency of argumentation in % for Clinton and Bush presidency and 
for both presidencies together 
Argument 
Democracy promotion enables/strengthens: Clinton Presidency Bush Presidency 
Clinton & Bush 
Presidencies 
America’s special mission and identity 22.3 26.2 24.4 
US national economy 10.7 1.0 5.6 
US national security 15.3 23.8 19.8 
US national interest 15.8 6.6 10.9 
Liberal-democratic world order 16.2 19.4 17.9 
Benefits for other people(s) 14.4 20.3 17.5 
residual 5.3 2.7 3.9 
A chi-square test points to a significant relationship between both variables (presidency and argument) at the 
level of p < 0.001. 
The cluster of arguments that officials of both presidencies most frequently invoke is a 
normative one, namely the idea that promoting democracy is a moral endeavor and/or 
that it is an expression of a specific American mission or role in the world and thus part of 
U.S. national identity – irrespective of whether rooted in the country’s religious or politi-
cal foundation, its historic roots, its culture or tradition, or its intrinsic values. These ar-
guments conform to a ‘logic of appropriateness’; U.S. policymakers tend to behave in 
accordance with what is considered to be normatively appropriate or consistent with 
American political identity (Monten 2005: 120). Promoting democracy, both administra-
tions are firmly convinced, is not only in line with American tradition; it is also a moral 
responsibility on the part of the American people to spread its values, and this is a role 
that other nations have come to expect and rely on. “Support for freedom is in the proud-
est tradition, from Washington and Jefferson, to Reagan and Clinton” (Albright 2000b) 
and “[t]he United States promotes freedom because it is right to do so, and because it is a 
part of our heritage as a nation” (Berger 1999). Even more forcefully, “[l]ike generations 
before us, we have a calling from beyond the stars to stand for freedom” (Bush 2004). In 
the count for the Clinton presidency, more than a fifth of all arguments fall into this cate-
gory (22.3 %), more than a fourth for the Bush presidency (26.2 %). As is clearly reflected 
in the choice of reasoning, the United States’ mission and identity with regard to democ-
racy promotion has had a strong and constant presence in speeches and documents from 
the past two decades.  
Under the Bush presidency, the second most frequently voiced reason for democrati-
zation abroad is the advancement of national security (23.8 %). The security argument is 
usually very straightforward. Officials often succinctly declare that the promotion of de-
mocracy will enhance America’s national security: “Only in an increasingly democratic 
world will the American people feel themselves truly secure” (Talbott 1996). Sometimes 
they refer to the fact that democracies do not sponsor terrorist acts and that “democracy 
promotion is the best antidote to terrorism” (Dobriansky 2003). Apart from arguing that 
democracy promotion in general contributes to U.S. security and stability, a few officials 
elaborate by pointing out that democracy promotion helps dry up the “breeding ground” 
for terrorism and extremism in recipient countries as it brings people freedom, security 
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and prosperity (or at least hope). According to former Secretary of State Albright (2000c), 
“We have found, through experience around the world, that the best way to defeat terror-
ist threats is to increase law enforcement capacities while at the same time promoting 
democracy and human rights”. Although the frequency of this argumentation is less sa-
lient under the Clinton presidency (15.3 %), it is by no means marginal. 
For the Bush administrations, two other lines of argument were relevant when empha-
sizing the rationales behind democracy promotion: the strengthening and advancement 
of a liberal-democratic world order (19.4 %) and the benefits for other people(s) (20.3 %). 
As to the former, officials often talk about democracy, peace (or the absence of war), and 
freedom or liberty as ends in themselves rather than means to other ends. They are as-
sumed to be globally shared values whose eventual culmination will be a liberal-
democratic world order of enduring peace, international stability and security. “Demo-
cracies don’t go to war with each other” (Clinton 1991) and “an ever-widening circle of 
democracies is forging a freer, more prosperous, and more peaceful international com-
munity” (Christopher 1993). From a perspective emphasizing the spread of democracy as 
a means to other ends, it is also considered a viable tool against the non-liberal world of 
authoritarian regimes and ‘outlaw states’ and, in the perspective of some, an effective tool 
fighting ‘evil’ in the world: “democracy and capitalism [...] are like twin lasers working in 
tandem all across the globe to illuminate the last dark corners of totalitarianism and dicta-
torship” (Powell 2001). 
Sometimes, officials use an argument neither evoking moral or material benefits for 
their electorate nor a liberal-democratic world order as a universal value to be pursued, 
but refer to the positive effects of democracy promotion on the recipient countries’ popu-
lations. These benefits for others either refer to the improvement of security, the economy 
or other more specific, material benefits that American democracy promotion brings to 
other peoples, or they refer to the non-material benefits all people have a right to enjoy: 
“We know from our own experience that democracy and free markets – for all their im-
perfections – are the best means to the ends to which people all over the world aspire: 
security, freedom and prosperity” (Lake 1995). Democracy and freedom are assigned a 
very strong and notably universal appeal, and officials often point out that other people 
deserve American support and solidarity in their struggle for their own universal rights. 
The combination of arguments relating to an American mission and to national secu-
rity under the Bush administration makes up half of all arguments voiced, whereas refer-
ring to benefits for others and the liberal-democratic world order both account for about 
one-fifth of all arguments. Thus, the Bush administration is strongly focused on four lines 
of argument. For the Clinton presidency, the result is more widely varied as six lines of 
argument receive remarkable attention, thus treating as relevant two argumentative pat-
terns that are negligible for the Bush presidency: fostering American national interest 
(15.8 %) and strengthening the U.S. economy (10.7 %). Since liberal-democratic world 
order and benefits for others both play an important role as well (16.2 % and 14.4 %), the 
Clinton administrations’ lines of argument are fairly evenly divided; here the margin be-
tween the strongest category (American mission at 22.3 %) and the weakest (U.S. eco-
nomic benefits with 10.7 %) is only a little more than 10 percentage points in comparison 
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to the Bush presidency’s 25 percentage points margin (between American mission with 
26.2 % and U.S. economic interests at only 1.0 %). 
Contrary to the expectations generated by Clinton’s general focus on the economy 
during his presidency, the connection between democracy promotion and the promotion 
of U.S. economic interests is not remarkably strong. Those making the argument consider 
democratic governance in a recipient country as a guarantor for a long-term stable politi-
cal regime which in turn strengthens the economy. Whether democracy primarily streng-
thens a country’s (free market) economy or whether the economy primarily strengthens 
the democratic system is disputed in the political (and academic) discourse, but it is gen-
erally accepted that both reinforce each other. In making their case, officials often point to 
stable and reliable trade relations between the U.S. and other democracies as well as to the 
opening up of relatively secure markets for American goods in democratic systems: “De-
mocracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, and they make for reliable 
trading partners” (Lake 1994). At 10.7 %, arguing for economic benefits is the least rele-
vant among the six lines of reasoning. When it comes to democracy promotion, it is clear-
ly not simply “the economy, stupid”. The assumption that Clinton’s main political driving 
force was the U.S. economy is not reflected in his administrations’ legitimizing strategy 
for democracy promotion. However, economic considerations may be concealed beneath 
the label of ‘national interest’, the Clinton presidency’s second strongest argumentative 
cluster (15.8 %). 
While the Clinton team attached great relevance to furthering the national interest 
through democracy promotion, the Bush administrations showed only little proclivity to 
evoke this idea (6.6 %). From Clinton officials one often heard that “[w]e are not starry-
eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy, but we know that to do so serves our 
interests” (Lake 1994) and that “from Central America to Central Asia, our interests dic-
tate that we should be FOR a world in which the democratic tide continues to rise” (Al-
bright 2001). The national interest, of course, is a somewhat elusive concept; it is undoub-
tedly of the highest importance and no one would dare to oppose it, but the term itself is 
open for interpretation and could include everything from enhancing national security 
and economic interests to fulfilling a moral duty, even to ignoring the matter of democra-
cy promotion altogether. Whatever it denotes in any specific reference, however, it is al-
ways regarded as crucial.  
The prominence of the national interest category in argumentation used during the 
Clinton presidency makes it even less safe to assume – as some of its critics have – that the 
Clinton presidency had a strong focus on the economy while not being too concerned 
about security issues. The results indicate that security considerations were no less impor-
tant than economic issues in the Clinton administrations. The Clinton record does pale 
quite a bit in comparison with the Bush administrations’ security rationale, which ac-
counted for nearly one-fourth of all lines of argument (23.8 %). If, however, one adds up 
all categories describing or at least including ‘hard’ U.S. interests – security interests, eco-
nomic interests, and the national interest – the Clinton result is over 10 percentage points 
ahead of the Bush count; 41.8 % versus 31.4 %. This is because – apart from the very pro-
nounced security focus – the Bush record is weak on arguing in favor of the national in-
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terest (6.6 %) and basically non-existent in terms of arguing on behalf of the economy. So 
when it comes to the so-called ‘hard’ interests, the Bush administrations chose to focus 
almost solely on national security, whereas the Clinton team argued along different lines, 
with a tendency to draw upon the somewhat vague ‘national interest’. 
Another difference in the choice of arguments emerges when comparing whether ad-
ministration officials, when arguing for a liberal-democratic world order, favor emphasiz-
ing democratization’s positive contributions to the community of democracies or its ef-
fect of enlightening, containing, or eliminating ‘enemies’ to liberalism and democracy. 
That democracies counter ‘evil’ only accounted for 2.1 % of the Clinton presidency’s lines 
of argument, whereas members of the Bush administrations relied on this line of argu-
ment in 6.4 % of all cases. The latter, however, drew upon democracies producing ‘good’ 
in only 1.0 % of all arguments, whereas the Clinton team’s count was 6.0 %.18
In this regard, another observation – one that has often been discussed elsewhere (Geis 
2006; Mazarr 2003) – is the Bush administrations’ proclivity to speak in Manichaean and 
messianic categories. This is true especially for the president himself, who in his rhetoric 
paints the world in the dichotomous terms of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, depicting a constant strug-
gle of biblical proportions between the good and pure forces of freedom and the evil and 
utterly destructive forces of terror and tyranny. “Evil men, obsessed with ambition and 
unburdened by conscience” (Bush 2005b) seek to eradicate everything the liberal world 
stands for: “Take almost any principle of civilization,” the president is convinced, “and 
their goal is the opposite” (Bush 2007). Not “allowing the violent to inherit the Earth” 
(Bush 2006) is the duty of the brave and valiant defenders of liberty. This struggle is defin-
itive and concessions are worthless:  
 The num-
bers are almost reversed, demonstrating a proclivity on the part of Bush representatives to 
evoke the image of an enemy who needs to be at least checked, possibly fought or elimi-
nated by democracies. This notion is distinctly less strongly embraced by the Clinton 
administrations. 
“We’re facing a radical ideology with inalterable objectives: to enslave whole nations and in-
timidate the world. No act of ours invited the rage of the killers – and no concession, bribe, 
or act of appeasement would change or limit their plans for murder. [...] We will never back 
down, never give in, and never accept anything less than complete victory.” (Bush 2005b) 
Whereas President Bush vociferously evokes democracy and freedom as the remedies for 
everything that goes wrong in the world, the Clinton representatives in comparison are 
more sober in their use of language. Apart from the almost complete absence of the suc-
cessor administration’s hyperbole during the Clinton presidency, democracy is sometimes 
even depicted as a possibly precarious condition. Secretary Albright, for example, con-
cedes that “[i]n truth, democracy can be maddening, messy, and muddled. But as Chur-
 
 
18 These findings – not presented in Table 1 – and other secondary results as well as a list of all 
primary documents used in the analysis can be found online here: www.hsfk.de/Publikationen. 
9.0.html?&no_cache=1&detail=4203&cHash=b6c37f825d. 
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chill famously observed, as a system of government, it is miles ahead of whatever is in 
second place” (Albright 2000a). Later in the same speech, she talks about how for many 
people the promise of democracy has not lived up to expectations and that “a majority [in 
the ‘New Independent States’, AEP] have come to equate democracy with inequality, and 
the unraveling of social fabric.” Elaborating further on the problems of democratization, 
she warns of “sham democracy” as a dangerous result, once again emphasizing U.S. re-
sponsibility to promote democracy with more effort and resources. 
Both administrations share the conviction that American values and American inter-
ests are either the same or mutually reinforce each other. As former Clinton Deputy Sec-
retary of State Talbott (1996) maintained, “[i]t is the basis for asserting, in rebuttal to 
some self-described realists’ insinuations to the contrary, that American values and inter-
ests reinforce each other.” Similarly, former Bush Secretary of State Rice explained: “I try 
to remind people that while at times there may seem to be short-term tradeoffs, that the 
United States has never been confused that in the long term our interests and our values 
are absolutely identical [...]” (Rice 2008). The assumption that national interests and val-
ues are usually not in conflict with each other, is, as has been shown, very much disputed 
in the academic community.  
Arguments against the promotion of democracy were, not surprisingly, a rare pheno-
menon in the documents and speeches analyzed. Counter-arguments were made a few 
times, though, in anticipation of or as indirect reactions to criticism, or simply in order to 
introduce the ensuing argumentation favoring democracy promotion in an even more 
pronounced way. The arguments against the promotion of democracy that speakers cov-
ered fell into two camps: the charge that democracy promotion is only a second- or third-
order objective and that pursuing it is a waste of resources, and the assumption that the 
United States is embarked upon a hegemonic crusade in which it naively seeks to impose 
its own values on other peoples regardless of their wishes, thereby potentially destabiliz-
ing their societies. Talbott’s rebuttal attacks the premises of both camps: 
“Those who hold that view often claim to be realists, to distinguish themselves from woolly-
minded idealists enamored of the notion that the United States can, and should, affect other 
countries’ internal affairs. Yet the so-called realist critique is anachronistic: it fails to take 
account of the growth of the global marketplace, along with the deepening and widening of 
interdependence among regions. It is in that sense unrealistic.” (Talbott 1996) 
Whereas Albright (2000a) simply refuses the possibility that democracy by definition 
could ever be imposed upon a people, Rice (2008) paints a picture of how things might 
have turned out had the United States never taken an interest in making the world a bet-
ter place; the result, in her view, would have been a bleak and hopeless world, in which 
Nazi Germany, Japanese imperial tyranny and the communist Soviet Union would still be 
running rampant. She is also among those who defend against the charge that democracy 
can only be promoted at the expense of creating greater instability. According to Rice:  
“For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle 
East. And ultimately, we got neither. Now, we must recognize, as we do in every other re-
gion of the world, that liberty and democracy are the only guarantees of true stability and 
lasting security.” (Rice 2005b)  
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“If the school of thought called “realism” is to be truly realistic, it must recognize that stabil-
ity without democracy will prove to be false stability, and that fear of change is not a posi-
tive prescription for policy.” (Rice 2005c)  
4.2 The rationales in perspective 
Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have made it clear that the time of exemplar-
ism is past; isolationism is a paradigm the American people can no longer afford. Democ-
racy promotion is one aspect of an American foreign policy of engagement guided by the 
belief in the indispensable necessity of American leadership in the world. As far as the 
most recent presidencies are concerned, the worldwide spread of democracy is an endea-
vor serving American as well as what is considered to be general international interests; in 
fact, these interests do not diverge but are identical. The liberal perspective, in whose tra-
dition both presidencies stand, upholds that all people want the same things out of life; 
that all people, naturally, aspire to the same values and rights. The expansion of the zone 
of democracies as the prime vehicle and guarantor of liberal rights, safety, and prosperity 
for all people, including the people of the United States, is, in the eyes of its proponents, 
an instrument and a goal beyond the nitpicking disputes between adherents of idealism 
and realism. Democracy promotion is considered an achievable goal in principle – minor 
difficulties notwithstanding – and it serves America’s and the world’s vital interests, while 
it also caters to America’s tradition and its sense of mission.  
As the overall results for both presidencies taken together show, the two dominant le-
gitimation strategies for democracy promotion are drawing upon the American ‘idealistic’ 
sense of mission (24.4 %) and invoking ‘realist’ national security (19.8 %), the ‘hardest’ of 
all ‘hard’ interests so to speak. The representatives offer no hint as to their perception of a 
possible fundamental contradiction or conflict between the two. Neither do desire for 
enhancement of a liberal-democratic world order or concern about benefits and rights for 
other peoples – the two lines of argument ranked third and fourth (17.9 % and 17.5 % 
respectively) – provide any point of conflict. In very clear and straightforward terms, 
American democracy promotion is portrayed as a fairly frictionless remedy for many of 
the United States’ as well as for the global society’s problems and concerns. This convic-
tion clearly echoes the American tradition of embracing the liberal premises that devel-
opment is a relatively smooth process and that in principle “all good things go together” 
(Desch 2007/08: 20-25). 
Arguments that deal with the U.S. historical mission to guide the world towards free-
dom and democracy provide the most frequently invoked justification for the administra-
tions’ designs to promote democracy. The strength of the mission-focused argumentation 
is further corroborated by the relatively high incidence of arguments pointing to benefits 
for others, which are closely related to missionary reasoning. Apparently, all speakers are 
convinced that the American public is highly susceptible to appeals to their identity and 
patriotic mission. As has been outlined in chapter 2, American political culture is indeed 
strongly informed by “a ‘civil religion’ which embraces the notion of a ‘manifest destiny’ 
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and ‘special providence’ of the U.S., of the overriding values of freedom, liberty and de-
mocracy” (Geis 2006: 149).  
Whereas the expectation that the Clinton team’s justifications would focus most nota-
bly on the economy turned out to be unwarranted, the Bush team’s overarching national 
security focus found clear expression in justifications for democracy promotion. The 
question posed by Steve Smith (2000: 78) on whether concerns for democracy or for the 
economy were in the ‘driver’s seat’ in Clinton’s enlargement agenda cannot be answered 
by these results. The comparatively low incidence of economic justifications in the Clin-
ton documents in this regard is quite stunning. If the Clinton administration indeed con-
sidered it obvious that democratization and the enhancement of free market systems 
beneficial to the U.S. were each others’ natural twins, one wonders why a tenth of the 
argumentation was still founded upon highlighting these economic benefits. 
That Clinton, as some scholars have pointed out, was indeed not a daydreaming ideal-
ist is an assumption corroborated by this study’s findings; as has been shown, American 
‘hard’ interests were used significantly more often to justify democracy promotion than 
during the Bush presidency. While Bush’s argumentation regarding ‘hard’ interests al-
most solely emphasizes the issue of national security, the Clinton argumentation strate-
gies are more diverse with references to the country’s national interest the most frequently 
used. The Clinton administrations operated at a time after the Cold War in which many 
Americans focused on domestic issues and during which it was not yet clear what exactly 
constituted the national interest with regard to foreign policy. The situation was very dif-
ferent for the Bush presidency after September 11, 2001, when the terrorist attacks had 
unmistakably demonstrated America’s (physical) vulnerability, and national security 
again turned into the undisputed primary prerogative. Thus, while idealists, realists, isola-
tionists, liberals and the followers of other foreign policy creeds were still debating what 
the new ‘uniting theme’ of foreign policy was to be after the Cold War, it probably was a 
viable and – arguably – safe strategy for the Clinton team to justify democracy promotion 
by evoking the national interest; a general concept that is regarded as crucial by all cur-
rents of thought and that holds critical importance regardless of how diffuse and unde-
fined it may temporarily be.  
The all-encompassing security architecture after the 2001 terrorist attacks is not only 
visible in the high occurrence of democracy-as-a-security-tool argumentation but also in 
the distribution of arguments pertaining to a liberal-democratic world order. Whereas the 
Clinton team favors pointing out the ‘good’ democracies tend to achieve over emphasiz-
ing the ‘evil’ that democracies need to counter, the first line of argument barely exists in 
the Bush record. The Bush presidency clearly prefers to evoke the image of an enemy that 
democracies have vowed to fight. This is in line with the new focus on national security as 
well as the new threat perception after the attacks; it also resonates with the scholarly con-
cern over the implications of the type of liberalism the Bush government embraced. 
Painting the enemy in sinister colors – presenting an evil and uncontainable threat to the 
free world – allowed the Bush team to underline and justify the dire necessity for their 
controversial and, at least in part, illiberal counteractions (Geis 2006: 150). The promo-
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tion of democracy as part of the attempt to reshape the world, especially when conducted 
through military means, became one of these controversial policies.  
For Clinton, on the other hand, there was no more or less specific enemy in sight and 
no war to win for which the public’s support needed to be rallied, so evoking the image of 
an antagonist – a cruel, inconvincible, and uncontainable one at that – probably did not 
appear a sensible thing to do. The September 11 attacks provided an opportunity for the 
successful construction and employment of the image of the ‘other’ (Geis 2006). But, as 
Desch (2007/08: 8) emphatically argues, the terrorist attacks are not responsible for the 
outburst of illiberal policies under the Bush administrations. American illiberalism, in this 
view, has become a greater problem because the end of the Cold War and the rise of U.S. 
hegemony also left American liberalism with fewer physical constraints. The attacks, then, 
should more appropriately be seen as a window of opportunity or a trigger which boosted 
existing illiberal tendencies.  
Scholars may very much doubt that democracy promotion is an excellent long-term 
antidote to the growth of terrorism; the Bush presidency presents itself as utterly con-
vinced. In a time of war, the security line of argument, with a 23.8 % share, is deemed to 
resonate extremely well with the public. Whole paragraphs making effective use of high-
profile rhetoric on the terrorist threat which has to be fought by freedom’s forces were 
placed prominently in the State of the Union Addresses from 2004 onwards. The force-
fulness with which the terrorist-fighting component of democracy promotion was em-
phasized in the second George W. Bush administration permits the assumption that this 
line of argumentation was increasingly used in defense of measures that were coming 
more and more under heavy criticism. It is likely that, in the beginning, the security ar-
gument’s primary purpose was to rally Americans around active (and military) democra-
cy promotion but that, towards the end of the Bush presidency, it was used primarily as a 
defensive strategy and a justification for wars that did not yield the promised results. 
In pointing out that freedom and democracy are something all the world’s peoples as-
pire to, speakers for Clinton and Bush probably react to the (realist) charge that indigen-
ous and cultural differences stand in the way of a successful implementation of democra-
cy from the outside. Administration representatives insist that human rights are universal, 
and democracy – in contrast to tyranny – can never be imposed. In both presidencies, this 
rationale is visible, although referring to the material benefits for others is slightly pre-
ferred. Historically, the logic of this argument has not been as persuasive as today’s poli-
cymakers would make it sound. As Schmitz points out, supporting right-wing dictator-
ships during the Cold War “was justified by the argument that non-Western European 
people were unprepared for self-government and that democratic governments in Third 
World nations would be weak and unstable” and thus easy prey for communism (Schmitz 
2006: 241). This assessment also conflicts with Secretary Rice’s assertion that democracy 
promotion leads to greater stability in recipient countries (Rice 2005a,b,c). As Desch 
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(2007/08: 23-25) notes, the premises of liberal thought even hold that strengthening de-
mocracy is more important than maintaining stability. This reasoning is a marked depar-
ture from the lines of arguments embraced during the Cold War.19
The triumphal belief that, after the Cold War, American interests and the ‘world’s in-
terests’ have become identical and that American institutions and values are exportable as 
well as universal (Monten 2005: 144-47) is reflected in both presidencies’ statements; 
though more strongly expressed by Bush representatives. The Clinton team struck a very 
optimistic, yet more sober note than the successor administrations, as can be concluded 
from its restricting itself to non-military means of democracy promotion, the more cau-
tious statements on the benefits and problems that democracy brings, as well as the lower 
ranking of arguments pointing out benefits for others in the analysis. In line with the lite-
rature’s assessment, it seems that the Clinton presidency was far less inspired than its 
successor by the belief that America’s democratic mission was indeed the remedy for 
most if not all American and global problems. It was quite pragmatic; if a clash between 
traditional interests and values were detected, the former would have priority.  
  
Both presidencies, as has been pointed out, uphold the belief that American interests 
and American values are expressed harmoniously through the worldwide spread of de-
mocracy. But it is mainly the Bush presidency which has been accused of showing a sig-
nificant lack of humility in exercising power (Monten 2005: 148). America’s hegemonic 
standing at the beginning of the 21st century and the September 11 attacks have provided 
the impetus for the illiberal excesses and subsequent policy failures that have drawn much 
more criticism than the Clinton team ever had to face for its own democracy promotion 
rhetoric and policy. As the following chapter will show, the latest president is working 
hard to distance himself from his predecessor’s lack of humility and illiberal excesses. 
5. The Obama presidency – shaking off the Bush legacy and 
finding a way forward 
Where the Obama administration stands on democracy promotion and, subsequently, 
whether its approach represents continuity or change with regard to preceding adminis-
trations has been a widely discussed issue in policy and journalistic circles. It appears that 
the current president has heeded the call of some to at least significantly tone down the 
rampant rhetoric and thereby distance himself and his policies from the Bush administra-
tion and its faults (Carothers 2007b; Goldsmith 2008); others are squarely disappointed 
by what they perceive as the “abandonment of democracy” (Muravchik 2009). Earlier 
fears that the Obama administration – in its attempt to distance itself from its predecessor 
 
 
19 On democracy promotion’s paradigm changes over the 20th century, see for example T. Smith 
2007. 
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and be ABB (“Anything But Bush”) – would completely turn away from promoting de-
mocracy, however, seem to be unwarranted. This chapter will lay out, at length, how the 
Obama administration has so far tackled democracy promotion and, briefly, outline the 
reasons the administration has cited in support of this policy. 
In terms of rhetoric and tone, the contrast to the Bush administration is glaring. Whe-
reas President Bush rarely missed out on talking about democracy, observers of the early 
Obama administration count the occasions on which the current president and his advis-
ers, sometimes ostentatiously, eschewed the issue. Not even once did Obama mention the 
word “democracy” in his inaugural address – the issue that his predecessor had made his 
central theme four years earlier. In addressing progress and setbacks of U.S. foreign policy 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the goal of establishing democratic governments has barely re-
ceived mention during the early months.20
When the Obama team did speak about democracy and its promotion – and it increa-
singly did so starting with the widely-received presidential speech in Cairo in June 2009 – 
a distinctly new tone of voice became discernible. Acknowledging the existing controver-
sy about democracy promotion and its connection to the Iraq war, Obama declared in 
Cairo that “no system of government can or should be imposed [on] one nation by any 
other.” While emphasizing his commitment “to governments that reflect the will of the 
people,” he struck a humble note when elaborating that  
 And Obama has also remained curiously re-
served on questions of democracy and freedom during the protests erupting after the 
fraudulent elections in 2009 in Iran and the ensuing repressions (Bouchet 2010). It was, 
however, not only the president himself that supporters of democracy promotion eyed 
with growing concern. During her Senate confirmation hearing in January 2009, Secretary 
of State Clinton referred to the ‘three Ds’ of defense, diplomacy and development as the 
new pillars of U.S. foreign policy, making observers wonder about the future role of the 
‘D’ of democracy in this administration. And on her first official visit to China, Clinton 
made waves by declaring that issues like human rights would not be addressed as “our 
pressing on those issues can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate 
change crisis and the security crisis” (quoted from Muravchik 2009: 22).  
“[e]ach nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the traditions of its 
own people. America does not presume to know what is best for everyone, just as we would 
not presume to pick the outcome of a peaceful election. But I do have an unyielding belief 
that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how 
you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; gov-
ernment that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you 
choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will 
support them everywhere.” (Obama 2009a) 
 
 
20 One commentator even argues that the administration’s insistence on the Afghanistan operati-
on being not about democracy sabotages the development of any credible democracy promoti-
on agenda (Hiatt 2010). 
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In this oft-quoted statement, President Obama embeds the democracy question in the less 
controversial language of human rights. Instead of speaking of universal rights being true 
and right for all people and all times, and instead of pointing out America’s indispensable 
role in creating and spreading these rights, he begins the enumeration of the basic ele-
ments of democratic government by pointing to his personal “unyielding belief” and ends 
it by putting American ideas squarely in the broader human rights framework. In stark 
contrast to most of his predecessor’s rhetoric, Obama even goes as far as stating that 
America does not know what is best for everyone – an admission that inspired a critic to 
comment that “[t]his, alas, is very much the claim advanced by many authoritarian re-
gimes, including the absolute monarchy of Saudi Arabia” (Muravchik 2009: 25).  
In a similar vein, the president explained in another high-profile speech – this time in 
front of the United Nation General Assembly – that 
“[d]emocracy cannot be imposed on any nation from the outside. Each society must search 
for its own path, and no path is perfect. Each country will pursue a path rooted in the cul-
ture of its people and in its past traditions. And I admit that America has too often been se-
lective in its promotion of democracy.” (Obama 2009b) 
Although Obama went on to talk about the continuing strong commitment to universal, 
basic principles for people everywhere, the changes in tone – if, possibly, not so much in 
substance – in the Cairo and UN speeches are remarkable. This humility in the language 
of a U.S. president is what provokes praise as well as rejection by those concerned with 
the fate of democracy promotion and foreign policy in general. Focusing predominantly 
on the administration’s rhetoric, Muravchik criticizes Obama for “turning so sharply 
away from the goals of human rights and democracy” instead of putting his own stamp 
on the policy. Bothered by what he perceives as a series of “mea culpas”, “national self-
abnegation” and a tendency for cultural relativism, he accuses the president of pursuing a 
strategy of “peace through moral equivalence” (Muravchik 2009: 22, 26). 
Hand in hand with the change of tone went a general re-positioning of democracy 
promotion within the larger field of foreign policy. After mostly eschewing the issue of 
democracy (promotion) during its first months in office, the administration slowly devel-
oped its own democracy promotion rhetoric, closely linking it to human rights and devel-
opment in general and thus embedding it in a broader framework. Sampling a few high-
level administration officials, Bouchet is convinced that the Obama team has taken up 
“both a developmental view of democracy and a democratized view of development”, 
essentially seeing little difference between the two concepts (Bouchet 2010). A statement 
by Secretary Clinton illustrates the connection between development and democracy: 
“Progress can only take hold if it is built on the foundation of economic growth and materi-
al improvements in people’s daily lives. One of the biggest challenges facing democracies 
everywhere – and I include my own country in 2009 – is we must demonstrate unequivocal-
ly that democracy produces positive outcomes for hardworking people who get up every 
day and do the best they can to raise their children, who go to work, who work hard, and 
deserve to have that hard work rewarded.” (H. Clinton 2009) 
In a similar vein, in an early interview with the Washington Post the president explained 
that he would like to consider democracy promotion “through a lens that is actually deliv-
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ering a better life for people on the ground and less obsessed with form, more concerned 
with substance” (quoted from Baker 2009). 
In contrast to Bush, who had treated democracy promotion as his signature issue, Ob-
ama is thus realigning democracy promotion with the promotion of human rights and 
development policies in general. Another difference in comparison to his immediate pre-
decessor is Obama’s pronounced multilateral approach. A recent presidential statement 
on the occasion of the ten-year anniversary of the Community of Democracies stresses 
the administration’s strong commitment to a multilateral endeavor. The president called 
the Warsaw Declaration, the Community’s founding document, “a powerful expression of 
our shared commitment to universal values and democratic principles”, and went on to 
explain that 
“[t]his forum also challenges us to act collectively, as a community of democratic nations, to 
support countries undergoing democratic transitions and to push back against threats to 
democratic progress. [...] I welcome this celebration of the Community’s first ten years and 
believe that its role in fostering strong and effective cooperation among the world’s demo-
cracies is essential for confronting the challenges ahead. Working together in partnership, 
we can advance the dignity of all human beings and the rights that are universal.” (Obama 
2010a) 
This, in the eyes of one observer, is a “full-throated endorsement of the Community of 
Democracies, beyond anything we heard from the Bush Administration” (Piccone 2010). 
It thus seems reasonable to assume that, in toning down the rhetoric and reframing the 
democracy promotion impetus, the administration is not breaking with the American 
foreign policy tradition of democracy promotion but rather – as other administrations 
have done before – has developed its own style and framework for tackling it (Bouchet 
2010). 
In light of this finding, could the current president be returning to a more Clintonian 
style of democracy promotion? The endorsement of multilateralism strikes a chord with 
those who – fondly or grudgingly – remember Clinton’s attempt to impress on U.S. for-
eign policy the stamp of “assertive multilateralism”. And, after all, Obama, just like Clin-
ton, is a Democratic president with a strong focus on the economy. As has been shown, 
the Obama administration’s rhetorical style – again similar to Clinton’s – is far less con-
frontational than the Bush administrations’ choice of words. Another similarity appears 
to be the labeling of the two Democratic president’s foreign policy approach as generally 
“pragmatic” and “realist”. In looking at how the early Obama administration handled the 
recent crises in Iran, Honduras, and Afghanistan from a democracy (promotion) stand-
point, Bouchet considers Obama “a liberal by belief but a moderate, pragmatic leader by 
temperament” (Bouchet 2010). The Obama team, quite busy in its first months with other 
pressing policy issues such as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, its promise to 
close Guantánamo as well as the global financial crisis, had not had time to lay out a de-
mocracy promotion approach or even to fill all relevant posts when these crises called for 
an immediate U.S. reaction in the early summer of 2009. As late as November of that year, 
Carothers pointed out that the administration was still “entirely missing a leadership team 
at a crucial time” (Carnegie Europe 2009: 2); the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bu-
reau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor had only been sworn into office on Sep-
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tember 23, 2009, and the relevant USAID appointments even took until the spring of 2010 
to be complete. Commentators were also surprised that Obama’s chief advisor on democ-
racy, Michael McFaul, had not been entrusted with the issue of democracy but had in-
stead been given the Russia portfolio in the National Security Council. 
So how did the administration react when it had to take a stand in the early summer of 
2009? When protests over the allegedly fraudulent elections in Iran erupted in June and 
were brutally repressed by the government, the Obama administration only found mod-
erately critical words, apparently acutely aware of possible damage any strong criticism 
could inflict on the diplomatic effort over Iran’s nuclear activities but also cognizant of 
the likelihood that any interference could lead to counterproductive effects and further 
delegitimize the Iranian opposition. As the Honduras coup d’état against President Zelaya 
in the same month shows, a country of less strategic importance but of relatively high U.S. 
influence did not automatically elicit a strong and consistent stand on democracy on part 
of the U.S. either; although the United States at first reacted by denouncing the ouster and 
imposing sanctions, it eventually lifted them again and – to the dismay of most other Lat-
in American countries – recognized the elections later that year.21
“Obama’s democracy promotion so far has been a low-key – even stealthy – affair conducted 
more by diplomacy than by exhortation and criticism. It is a realist approach that realizes de-
mocratization, however desirable, clashes with other strategic goals.” (Bouchet 2010) 
 The August election 
fraud in Afghanistan, where, as Bouchet (2010) points out, the United States holds impor-
tant strategic interests as well as significant influence, again displayed the Obama admin-
istration’s unwillingness to loudly defend and call for democracy and adherence to its 
principles. Apparently, the United States put pressure on the Karzai government through 
unofficial channels but, not least because it depends on Afghan cooperation, did not have 
much success. Bouchet concludes: 
Carothers agrees with regard to the diagnosis of the new administration’s realism and 
pragmatism – as well as its long-persisting uncertainty and caution – and places the new 
approach within the larger foreign policy framework of “re-engagement and partnership 
with the world” that Obama has embraced (Carnegie Europe 2009: 7-8). The new position 
in the White House, he explains, is closer to the European approach of democracy and 
human rights promotion. As the administration sees it, no matter how distasteful the 
authoritarian governments and practices may be to deal with, one needs to stay engaged 
in order to bring about democratic change. As Obama put it in his Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech: 
“The promotion of human rights cannot be about exhortation alone. At times, it must be 
coupled with painstaking diplomacy. I know that engagement with repressive regimes lacks 
the satisfying purity of indignation. But I also know that sanctions without outreach – con-
demnation without discussion – can carry forward only a crippling status quo. No repressive 
regime can move down a new path unless it has the choice of an open door.” (Obama 2009c) 
 
 
21 It should be noted, however, that according to news reports insistent voices in the U.S. Senate 
are – at least partially – responsible for the eventual recognition of the elections.   
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Consequently, “Practicing Principled Engagement with Non-Democratic Regimes” is the 
second item on a list enumerating how the U.S. is advancing universal values in the Na-
tional Security Strategy (2010: 38). From this perspective, if one severs all ties in protest, 
one also loses leverage and the opportunity for influence. The Obama administration is 
thus walking a very fine line in re-engaging countries like Russia, China, Iran and others, 
and it will probably remain under attack for selling out on democracy and human rights – 
a charge to which it will respond that clamorous rhetoric and setting singular examples 
under the Bush government have yielded no results and that it is now time to give quiet 
engagement in a productive relationship with a non-democratic country a chance (Car-
negie Europe 2009: 8-10). Obama’s softer tone and more development-oriented thinking 
complement this basic realist direction.  
While critics of the Obama administration seem to be particularly disturbed by the 
president’s lack of patriotic oratory and his conceding of mistakes, this reorientation is 
exactly what many critics of the Bush administrations’ approach have been hoping for. 
Many consider democracy promotion an essential U.S. foreign policy goal and tool but 
admit that it has become quite a bit “radioactive” under Bush (quoted from Baker 2009) 
and thus see it as in dire need of “de-toxification” from the Bush legacy. This legacy in-
cludes a close entanglement of democracy promotion with the “War on Terror”, regime 
change and the use of military force, as well as a worldwide loss of credibility on the part 
of the United States; a loss partly due to high-profile messianic rhetoric about democracy 
and universal rights on the one hand, the blatant violation of some of these rights in 
Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib on the other (Baker 2009, Carothers 2007b). As early as 
September 2007, Carothers called for the domestically and internationally discredited 
concept of democracy promotion to be repaired by the next government by reducing the 
glaring gap between words and deeds, disentangling the concept from fighting terror, 
making democracy promotion less America-centric, and thus restoring American credi-
bility and the power of setting a positive example (Carothers 2007b). Carothers’ particular 
warning that “[a]ny post-Bush effort to relaunch democracy promotion without regaining 
the power of the positive U.S. example will be stillborn” (Carothers 2007b) is one appar-
ently resonating with Obama. As the president recently declared:  
“As I have said many times, there is no more powerful tool for advancing democracy and 
human rights than our own example – we promote our values by living our values at 
home.” (Obama 2010a) 
Praising passive democracy promotion – not actively engaging abroad but leading by 
example – as the most important tool in this policy’s toolbox is remarkable because this 
notion was rarely, if ever, emphasized by former Clinton and Bush officials. The “beacon 
theme” is one frequently recurring in Obama statements and is also strongly embedded in 
his National Security Strategy, where Obama explicitly highlights the prohibition of tor-
ture “without Exception or Equivocation” in order to strengthen the power of the U.S. 
example (NSS 2010: 36, 10). Though it is scarcely conceivable that Obama will completely 
abandon the activist part of foreign engagement for democracy, he might be paving the 
way for less, possibly more selective, engagement only in countries welcoming U.S. en-
gagement, thus again evoking the Clintonian style of democracy promotion.  
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Consequently, it appears that President Bush’s “perfect vindicationist storm” (Monten 
2005: 140) is now being followed by a new period of relative exemplarism. In line with the 
thesis that periods of activist democracy promotion are enabled by the convergence of a 
rise in material capabilities along with the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology that 
favors vindicationism over exemplarism (Monten 2005), an Obamanian turn towards 
exemplarism can be explained by the convergence of three factors: the oft-praised unipo-
lar moment that the end of the Cold War had brought about has vanished in light of fast-
rising new powers such as China and India; partially in response to that, the U.S. has re-
cently been confronted with an internal debate about its own decline; and the forceful and 
strongly ideological attempt by the Bush presidency to democratize the world has severely 
backfired and discredited the United States. Reframing democracy promotion primarily 
as an exemplarist endeavor, in which living by one’s own ideals is considered to be the 
most powerful influence on others, therefore appears to be a logical – low-cost as well as 
credible – consequence. 
In terms of democracy assistance, no significant differences between the Bush and Ob-
ama administrations are discernible. The Obama administration’s first two budget re-
quests offer no general reason for concern to the democracy promotion community; on 
the contrary, requests for foreign aid increased, including the budget’s ‘Governing Justly 
and Democratically’ section, which accounted for $2.81 billion in the budget request for 
2010 (an increase of 9 % compared to the previous request) and rose another 25 % to a 
record $3.3 billion in 2011 (Freedom House 2009, 2010). Most of this increment, howev-
er, is due to higher investment proposals in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, Pakistan. 
Whereas Obama has shifted attention to and away from different countries and regions 
and redirected some distribution channels, the numbers do not speak a significantly dif-
ferent language than those of his predecessor’s.  
What, then, are the rationales that the Obama team cites in favor of democracy pro-
motion? No systematic assessment comparable to the Clinton and Bush administrations 
(chapter 4) is possible yet, so, in order to answer this question, the available speeches and 
documents that address democracy promotion have been searched for motivations that 
are voiced. There are, however, only a few relevant documents; and within these, only 
very few arguments can be found. Two observations stand out: first, normative argumen-
tation in general is dominant. In almost all instances closely connected to human rights, 
the Obama administration repeatedly emphasizes its conviction that “it is the responsi-
bility of all free people and free nations to make clear that these movements [democratic 
reform movements, AEP] – these movements of hope and history – they have us on their 
side” (Obama 2009c) and that basic democratic principles “are not just American ideas; 
they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere” (Obama 
2009a).  
Second, those few arguments relating democracy promotion to interests rarely pertain 
to U.S. national interests but more broadly to those which benefit either the whole world 
or countries receiving democracy aid. Apart from the normative reasoning, the Cairo 
speech, for example, offers only one other argument in favor of democracy promotion: 
“Governments that protect these rights are ultimately more stable, successful and secure” 
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(Obama 2009a). In Oslo, the president underlined the significance of democracy and hu-
man rights for the “nature of the peace we seek,” which he defined as “a just peace based 
on the inherent rights and dignity of every individual” (Obama 2009c). So far, only in the 
National Security Strategy 2010 can one detect an argument that is straightforwardly 
based on U.S. interests, even if only coming in second place: “The United States supports 
the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments that respect 
these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate. We also do so because their success 
abroad fosters an environment that supports America’s national interests” (NSS 2010: 37). 
As the final lines of this chapter were being written, Obama attracted the attention of 
the democracy promotion community with his second speech before the UN General 
Assembly on September 23, 2010, thus underlining that any assessment of his under-
standing of democracy promotion can only be preliminary. At this significant venue, Ob-
ama for the first time spoke at length about his administration’s democracy and human 
rights agenda, prompting commentators to talk about Obama’s “new democracy rhetoric” 
and wonder whether a “genuine shift” was in sight (Hiatt 2010; Wilson 2010). Despite a 
slight shift in emphasis, however, this speech broadened and elaborated on tendencies 
noted earlier. Obama did, for the first time explicitly and in detail, emphasize U.S. stakes 
and interest in the global advancement of democracy and human rights, but he squarely 
put the responsibility on the shoulders of all democratic states as well as the United Na-
tions. Using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 as a point of depar-
ture, he explained that “freedom, justice, and peace for the world must begin with free-
dom, justice, and peace in the lives of individual human beings. And for the United States, 
this is a matter of moral and pragmatic necessity” (Obama 2010b). Remaining firmly 
grounded on a broader human rights and development framing of the issue, he urged 
other democracies to do more to support other peoples in their struggle. He specifically 
demanded action from young democracies whom he told not to “stand idly by”: “Recall 
your own history. Because part of the price of our own freedom is standing up for the 
freedom of others” (ibid.). In clear contrast to his predecessor, Obama called for a more 
proactive UN role in fostering global (democratic) development and highlighted multila-
teral initiatives.  
A slight shift in tone became discernible when Obama reiterated his conviction that 
“each country will pursue a path rooted in the culture of its own people” – this time this 
statement is followed directly by a qualification: “Yet experience shows us that history is 
on the side of liberty; that the strongest foundation for human progress lies in open econ-
omies, open societies, and open governments.” Obama’s attempt to unite the often con-
flicting concepts of universal values and local tradition is most obvious when he main-
tains that “[t]here is no soil where this notion [that every citizen demands a say in how 
they are governed] cannot take root, just as every democracy reflects the uniqueness of a 
nation.” But he also repeated his earlier stated conviction that strengthening the founda-
tions of freedom in democratic countries so that they can be an example to others and 
thereby “light the world” is central to the endeavor (ibid.).  
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When asked about the differences between Obama’s and Bush’s democracy agenda, 
Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes is quoted as 
saying that 
“[t]he Obama one is pragmatic and focused on doing what is best to promote the specific 
capabilities needed in specific countries. [...] So in some sense, ironically for this president, 
it’s less rhetorical and more roll-up-your-sleeves build capacity in emerging democracies.” 
(quoted from Wilson 2010) 
Whether this is true and whether there is a genuine shift not only in rhetoric but also in 
the implementation of democracy promotion remains to be seen. As this survey of the 
new administration’s first one-and-a-half-years in office has shown, Obama is not settled 
on doing away with democracy on his foreign policy agenda, but is finding his own ap-
proach – one definitely quieter and more restrained than his predecessor’s and probably 
more pragmatist in style. A substantial evaluation of his understanding of democracy 
promotion both in word and deed, however, will have to wait for another year or two. 
6. The way forward 
President Obama will not and cannot abandon democracy promotion altogether. Democ-
racy promotion in the daily business of U.S. foreign policy may have time and again been 
used rhetorically without serious backing, been relegated to taking the back seat in policy 
implementation, and on a regular basis even been intentionally used to conceal other 
interests – it remains an issue at the center of U.S. foreign policy, not least because it is an 
issue at the heart of U.S. national identity. That democracy promotion can be misused as 
a label to gloss over less-than-democratic policies and that ignoring the issue publicly 
sparks the kind of debate witnessed in the early Obama months even underlines its signi-
ficance. The American sense of a missionary purpose to carry the light of freedom and 
democracy into the world – as a debt owed to the ‘founding fathers’, the fulfillment of a 
providential plan or a task rooted in the commitment to universal human rights – is too 
deeply entrenched in U.S. national identity to be ignored or dropped completely by any 
president of that country. And although it is too early to systematically document the 
officially voiced motivations for democracy promotion in the Obama administration, the 
statements discussed have already made it clear that the notion of America’s normative 
commitment to democracy remains at the center of democracy promotion’s legitimacy. 
Looked at from a democracy promotion angle, the post-Cold War administrations of 
President Clinton, President Bush, and probably even President Obama represent conti-
nuity rather than change. Democracy promotion, as the analysis has shown, is not a for-
eign policy fad, nor merely a vehicle for disguising ‘hard’ interests, but is quite obviously 
an issue spanning the partisan divide – despite the differences between Democratic and 
Republican presidencies and despite Obama’s attempt to distance himself from his prede-
cessor’s ‘freedom agenda’. Apart from being the manifestation of a special role in the 
world, democracy promotion is associated with all kinds of benefits: advancing one’s own 
security and prosperity as well as those of others and creating global stability and peace in 
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a liberal democratic world order. Clinton and Bush administration representatives may 
disagree on the relative weight and nuances of these goals but concur in principle in the 
conviction that spreading democracy abroad has normative and material benefits to U.S. 
citizens as well as to the rest of the world. Democracy promotion, then, is not a specific 
neo-conservative project or an outgrowth of Bush’s “War on Terror” but, after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, has been refocused and placed at the center of security policy.  
“De-centering” democracy promotion is what Obama did during his first months in 
office. Given the strong prominence of democracy promotion rhetoric under both his 
predecessors, especially in the administration immediately preceding his, the Obama 
team’s initial and continuing reserve on this matter is quite striking. The current presi-
dent, however, neither broke with the U.S. foreign policy tradition of democracy promo-
tion nor did he proceed with it unchanged. After, presumably, enough time had passed 
for democracy promotion to have become “detoxified” from its Bush legacy, it has re-
turned to a condition in keeping with Obama’s overall foreign policy agenda, which is 
more pragmatist and realist in style. Since a strong focus on democracy promotion stands 
in the way of Obama’s attempt at reframing the foreign policy agenda in the name of re-
engagement and global partnership, democracy promotion is no longer the signal catch 
phrase and a foreign policy panacea but has been ‘downgraded’; it is now closely con-
nected with promoting human rights in general and embedded within a broader and not-
ably multilateral development policy. When Obama did choose to speak about democracy 
at all, he chose his words carefully, underlining leading by example as the most important 
means of democracy promotion and emphasizing mutual understanding, past mistakes 
and a vow to respect every people’s right to pursue its own path to democracy. His de-
mocracy language is devoid of stark, dichotomizing images of light and dark and good 
and evil. Since little has changed so far in terms of implementing democracy promotion – 
the assistance budget has not changed significantly and no new on-the-ground agenda has 
emerged – the starkest contrast between the Bush and Obama administrations might in-
deed be the choice of language and tone.  
Whereas, from a broad perspective, continuity rather than change characterizes U.S. 
democracy promotion after the Cold War, Obama’s marked departure from Bush’s gran-
diose and Manichean rhetoric does constitute a clear element of change and has not been 
simply a marginal adjustment. The rhetorical framing of this issue – as of many others – 
matters greatly. Whereas Schweller (2000: 62), referring to the Clinton presidency, points 
out that cheap talk and a little action will probably not harm U.S. interest and may even 
produce marginal benefits, Goldsmith, commenting on the late Bush presidency, is con-
vinced of harmful effects and consequently recommended adopting a lower profile: 
“This means limiting the self-righteous oratory about freedom, because it triggers a defen-
sive response in many corners of the globe that damages U.S. standing and influence. [...] 
Blustering, all-embracing democracy promotion is not a way to enhance national security 
because it wastes U.S. resources and can prove counterproductive in furthering the ultimate 
goal, which is to add to the world population of pluralistic majoritarian states”. (Goldsmith 
2008: 146-47) 
Closing the gap between words and deeds, from this quite plausible standpoint, is hence a 
matter of political prudence and necessity. After rhetorically distancing itself from its 
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predecessor – while not making significant changes with regard to democracy assistance – 
the Obama administration is, however, now ending the silence and introducing its own 
(rhetorical) democracy promotion framework, thus not breaking with the democracy 
promotion tradition in U.S. foreign policy at all.  
So, is Obama taking a Clintonian turn with regard to democracy promotion? Yes, in 
the sense that he subscribes to a more pragmatic approach and would probably agree to 
the Clintonian focus on states where the U.S. can make the greatest difference and where 
democracy is already on its way. Yes, also in the sense that Obama favors a multilateral 
and non-confrontational approach to democracy promotion. But the Obama approach, 
insofar as it has become discernible during the first one-and-a-half years of his adminis-
tration, is certainly not merely a return from the exuberant Bush period to the democracy 
promotion mainstream bearing the stamp of Clinton’s administration. The Obama ad-
ministration, in contrast to both predecessors, is more sober and pragmatic in assessing 
democracy promotion’s chances and its benefits to everyone involved; looking at the ar-
guments made, it appears that the administration tends to consider democracy and hu-
man rights as important in their own right and not so much as means to other (U.S.) 
ends. With regard to the means of spreading democracy, it presents itself as more flexible 
and emphasizes patience as well as the need to become engaged and sustain a critical and 
constructive dialogue. Carothers (Carnegie Europe 2009: 8-10) even likens the new ap-
proach to the European style of democracy promotion and speculates about a closer part-
nership between the U.S. and Europe on that matter. This assessment should, however, not 
hide the fact that Obama has also continued unilateral development policies and partially 
even increased confrontational measures in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Yemen; but these policies are no longer carried out in the name of democracy promotion.  
The Obama-Clinton comparison has another clear limit, which lies in the internation-
al context. Clinton had assumed office during a period that, in retrospect, appears eu-
phoric; democracy and freedom had prevailed over communism, were in high demand all 
around the globe and had just produced a ‘third wave’. The promotion of democracy at 
that time was considered a promising and relatively risk-free endeavor, the scholarly as 
well as the political community was debating the ‘democratic peace’ and the ‘right to de-
mocracy’, and no serious obstacles to implementing democracy were perceived. In 2010, 
however, the optimism is long gone and the prospects are sobering: scholars may differ on 
its degree and characteristics, but a backlash against democracy and democracy promo-
tion has indeed manifested itself in many corners of the world, as authoritarian regimes in 
the past years have more self-confidently brushed off democratization pressures. Some 
have begun to offer their own model for propagation elsewhere, while the United States 
faces another debate about its alleged decline. That democracy promotion is not an easy, 
quite smooth task which can be achieved everywhere has become apparent as resistance 
to prescribed democracy models has manifested itself ‘on the ground’ and catchwords 
such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘ownership’ have regained strength in the general debate. The 
liberal premise that all good things go together has been severely challenged. This is cer-
tainly not entirely the Bush administration’s fault, although its close linking of democracy 
promotion and the “War on Terror” and its endorsing of illiberal practices probably ex-
acerbated the backlash process.  
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Democracy promotion is hence unlikely to return to its former stature at any time 
soon, but it will remain important. Under the Obama presidency, democracy promotion 
is definitely not in the ‘driver’s seat’ – if ever it was – but is one foreign policy instrument 
and goal among others. Acknowledging this reality that Bush had chosen to rhetorically 
gloss over is probably a smart strategy for dealing with a tainted legacy and restoring 
American credibility – and for making sense of a new foreign policy that values partner-
ship and engagement, even with authoritarian states, over proclaimed normative dogmat-
ism and unilateralism. 
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